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PROOF THEORY OF MARTIN-LO¨F TYPE THEORY. AN OVERVIEW1
Anton SETZER 2
summary – We give an overview over the historic development of proof theory and the main
techniques used in ordinal theoretic proof theory. We argue, that in a revised Hilbert’s programme,
ordinal theoretic proof theory has to be supplemented by a second step, namely the development
of strong equiconsistent constructive theories. Then we show, how, as part of such a programme,
the proof theoretic analysis of Martin-Lo¨f type theory with W-type and one microscopic universe
containing only two finite sets in carried out. Then we look at the analysis Martin-Lo¨f theory with
W-type and a universe closed under the W-type, and consider the extension of type theory by one
Mahlo universe and its proof-theoretic analysis. Finally we repeat the concept of inductive-recursive
definitions, which extends the notion of inductive definitions substantially. We introduce a closed
formalisation, which can be used in generic programming, and explain, what is known about its
strength.
keywords – Martin-Lo¨f type theory, Proof theory, Kripke-Platek set theory, W-type, Well-
founded trees, Kleene’s O, Mahlo universe, Inductive-recursive definitions, Generic programming
re´sume´ – La the´orie de la preuve de la the´orie des types de Martin-Lo¨. Une vue d’ensemble
Nous donnons une vue d’ensemble du de´veloppement historique de la the´orie de la preuve et des
principales techniques utilise´es dans la the´orie ordinale de la preuve. Nous soutenons que, dans
une forme re´vise´e du programme d’Hilbert, la the´orie ordinale de la preuve doit eˆtre comple´te´e par
une seconde e´tape, a` savoir le de´veloppement de the´ories constructives fortes et e´quiconsistantes.
Comme partie d’un tel programme, nous pre´sentons ensuite l’analyse, en the´orie de la preuve, de
la the´orie des types de Martin-Lo¨f avec un univers microscopique ne contenant que deux types finis.
Nous examinons ensuite l’analyse de la the´orie des types de Martin-Lo¨f avec type W et un univers
clos pour ce type, puis nous e´tendons la the´orie des types par un univers de Mahlo et conside´rons
son analyse en the´orie de la preuve. Enfin, nous pre´sentons le concept de de´finition inductive-
re´cursive, qui e´tend de fac¸on substantielle la notion de de´finition inductive. Nous introduisons une
formalisation close, qui peut eˆtre employe´e en programmation ge´ne´rique, et expliquons ce que nous
savons de sa force ordinale.
mots cle´s – The´orie des types de Martin-Lo¨f, The´orie de la preuve, The´orie des ensembles
de Kripke Platek, Type W, Arbres bien fonde´s, Ordinaux de Kleene, Univers de Mahlo, De´finitions
inductive-re´cursives, Programmation ge´ne´rique
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this article is to introduce the reader, who is not necessarily an expert
in proof theory, into the current state of the art of proof theory of Martin-Lo¨f type
1 Article rec¸u le 25 septembre 2003, re´vise´ le 1 fe´vrier 2004, accepte´ le 15 fe´vrier 2004.
2 Supported by Nuffield Foundation, grant ref. NAL/00303/G and EPSRC grant
GR/S30450/01. Department of Computer Science, University of Wales Swansea, Singleton Park,
Swansea SA2 8PP, UK, a.g.setzer@swan.ac.uk
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theory and the techniques used there. We start by giving a brief overview over the
contents of this article.
In Section 2., we first reconsider the original form of Hilbert’s programme: to
prove the consistency of theories for carrying out mathematical proofs using finitary
methods. We then discuss the theory PRA, which is usually taken as the formali-
sation of finitary methods. Next we look at Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem
and the fall of Hilbert’s programme. Then we discuss Gentzen’s proof theoretic
analysis of Peano arithmetic. We will look at the techniques used there – the notion
of an ordinal notation system and cut elimination. Then we introduce the two main
(usually equivalent) notions of proof theoretic strength.
In the short Section 3., we discuss, why a traditional proof theoretic analysis
should be supplemented by a second step, namely the development of equiconsistent
constructive theories.
In Section 4., we consider a relatively small variant of type theory, Martin-Lo¨f
type theory with Wrm-type and a microscopic universe atom. This is used in order
to introduce the basic techniques of proof theory, the relationship of these type
theories to so called admissible ordinals, and to variants of a weak version of set
theory called Kripke-Platek set theory.
In Section 5. we will look at the first major example, Martin-Lo¨f type theory with
Wrm-type and one universe. We will see that, in order to obtain an upper bound,
one can model type theory in Kripke-Platek set theory extended by one recursively
inaccessible and finitely many admissibles above it, which can be analysed easily.
In Section 6., we first develop a formalisation of a Mahlo universe and discuss
its constructive validity. We then discuss a suitable extension of Kripke-Platek set
theory of the same strength, and give some hints about how to model type theory
in this set theory.
In Section 7., we look at one application of the results obtained in the area of
generic programming. We consider P. Dybjer’s concept of inductive-recursive defi-
nitions, which is a substantial generalisation of the concept of inductive definitions
and includes standard (non-Mahlo-) universe constructions. Then we will develop
a theory in which one can introduce all inductive-recursive sets. This theory will
have a data type of inductive-recursive definitions, and allows therefore to introduce
functions, which take a data type, analyse it and create another data type from it –
this is a very general form of generic programming. This type theory makes use of
the ideas contained in the definition of the Mahlo universe, and subsumes a slightly
weakened form of the Mahlo universe.
In appendix A, we give a direct well-ordering proof for an ordinal notation system
of strength ǫ0. This forms the basis for developing well-ordering proofs, the main
tool for determining lower bounds for the strength of type theories.
In appendix B we give details about how to model Martin-Lo¨f type theory with
Wrm-type and one universe in a corresponding variant of Kripke-Platek set theory,
which can be analysed easily. We will as well show how to obtain a lower bound
by carrying out a direct well-ordering proof for a corresponding ordinal notation
system.
Appendix C will describe some details about how to obtain an upper bound for
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the strength of type theory with Wrm-type and one Mahlo universe by modelling it
in Kripke-Platek set theory with one recursively Mahlo ordinal. We will not go into
details w.r.t. the well-ordering proof for this type theory.
In appendix D we will show that type theory introduced in Section 7. reaches
the strength of Kripke-Platek set theory plus recursive Mahloness of the universe.
2. THE NOTION OF PROOF-THEORETIC STRENGHT
Hilbert’s programme. Proof theory was established as a science by D. Hilbert.
In his famous list of mathematical problems [Hilbert, 1900], he posed as second
problem to show the consistency of an axiomatisation of the real numbers developed
by him. He argued that, if this axiomatisation is shown to be consistent, this
would prove the mathematical existence of the concept of real numbers and of the
continuum: consistency implies existence. He stated as well the main problem,
namely that, if one shows the consistency of a theory for formalising mathematics in
the same theory, one has not achieved anything: if the original theory is inconsistent,
it proves everything, even its own consistency. So in order to achieve something, one
has to do more: namely show the consistency using methods which are considered
to be safe. According to Hilbert, finitary methods were to be considered to be safe.
By finitary methods he considered finitary calculations, as we can carry them out
on a piece of paper.
Later his problem was generalised to what is now known as Hilbert’s programme:
to prove the consistency of axiom systems, in which certain parts of mathematics
can be carried out, by finitary means.
There are two main approaches for carrying out consistency proofs. One is to
introduce a model of the system in question in the Meta-theory. However, it seems
to be implausible to assume that one can prove this way the consistency of a theory
by using finitary methods, since such methods do not allow the use of sets. Hilbert
realized this and suggested therefore that one should instead analyse proofs and show
this way directly that it is not possible to derive in the formal system in question
a contradiction. He called the mathematical discipline, in which such investigations
are carried out, proof theory.
The first step was to establish a precise formalisation of what is meant by math-
ematical theories. A theory for formalising basic logic had to be introduced. One
of these formalisations, the Hilbert-calculus, is due to Hilbert. Later many other
equivalent ones were developed, and the probably currently in proof theory most
popular one is the Tait calculus [Tait, 1968]. By adding axioms about mathematical
entities to such logic calculi, one obtains theories in which mathematical proofs can
be formalised.
Hilbert developed one technique for carrying out consistency proofs in his sense,
the epsilon-substitution method ([Hilbert and Bernays, 1939], see as well recent
work by Mints and Tupailo, e.g. [Mints and Tupailo, 1999, Mints et al., 1996]).
Primitive-Recursive Arithmetic was introduced by Skolem in his article
[Skolem, 1923]. There he reasoned informally in a system, which was later formalised
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and called primitive-recursive arithmetic (PRA). This system is nowadays generally
regarded as being a formalisation of what Hilbert meant by finitary methods.
The only objects in PRA are natural numbers. The basic notion is that of
a primitive recursive function. The primitive recursive functions, which are func-
tions Nn → N for arbitrary n, are those, which can be constructed from the con-
stant zero function (λx.0), projection functions (i.e. λ(x0, . . . , xn−1).xi, which de-
notes the function f : Nn → N s.t. f(x0, . . . , xn−1) = xi), and successor func-
tion (λx.x + 1) by using composition (i.e. if f, gi are primitive recursive, so is
λ(x0, . . . , xn−1).f(g1(x0, . . . , xn−1), . . . , gk(x0, . . . , xn−1)) and the schema of primi-
tive recursion: if f and g are primitive recursive, so is the function h defined by
h(~x, 0) = f(~x), h(~x, y + 1) = g(~x, y, h(~x, y)). Addition, multiplication and exponen-
tiation can easily be defined using primitive recursion. The defining equations for
the primitive recursive functions provide a schema for calculating the result of these
functions in finite amount of time. Therefore the primitive recursive functions can
be regarded as finitary operations.
The terms of PRA are now expressions which are constructed from variables and
0 by application of symbols for primitive recursive functions. If we substitute the
free variables by numbers, they can be evaluated in finite amount of time. Therefore
these terms can be regarded as finitary schemata.
The formulae in Skolem’s system were all propositional formulae constructed
from equations, i.e. the set of formulae is the least set containing the equations, and
which is closed under negation, conjunction and disjunction. Define first a−· b :=
max{0, a−b}, which can be defined primitive-recursively. Then we can encode a = b
as (a−· b) + (b−· a) = 0, ¬(a = 0) as (1−· a) = 0, (a = 0) ∧ (b = 0) as a + b = 0 and
a = 0 ∨ b = 0 as a · b = 0. By repetitively applying these operations we can encode
all propositional formulae as equations of the form a = 0, and can restrict the set of
formulae therefore to equations. These equations relate finitary schemata with each
other.
Skolem used in his reasoning as basic laws the defining equations for primitive-
recursive functions, the standard laws of = (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and
substitution) and the classical laws for the propositional connectives. (One can show
that restricted to quantifier free formulae with decidable prime formulae, classical
and intuitionistic logic coincide). The only strong law he used is that of induction
over primitive recursive formulae. Using the above encoding, the system can be
restricted to a theory having as formulae equations only, and where we omit there-
fore the laws for the propositional connectives (a systematic development of this
can be found in [Goodstein, 1964]). The resulting laws can now be regarded as a
formulation of what Hilbert meant by finitary methods: Assume an equation t = t′
is derived this way, and let s, s′ be the result of substituting all variables in t, t′ re-
spectively by numbers. By going through the derivation (a proof of a corresponding
Meta-theorem requires induction on the derivation) one can easily see that s and
s′ reduce to the same number, and, when investigating it, one has never to refer
to the set of natural numbers as an entity, but needs to refer only to finitely many
numbers.
It can easily be shown that the following system is conservative over Skolem’s
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version of PRA for equational formulae, i.e. that both theories derive the same
propositional formulae: One takes as formulae arbitrary first-order formulae (i.e. all
formulae with quantifiers ranging over natural numbers), built from equations of
terms as given before. As rules one takes the basic rules of the predicate calculus
(i.e. basic logic for formulae), and basic laws of equality (which involve the extended
language). Furthermore, one adds the rule of induction over quantifier-free (i.e.
propositional) formulae. The proof that we obtain a conservative extension can be
carried out using proof theoretic techniques in PRA. In proof theory, by PRA one
usually means the just mentioned theory, and we will follow in the rest of this article
this convention.
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem and the failure of Hilbert’s orig-
inal programme. 1931 Go¨del showed in his second incompleteness theorem
[Go¨del, 1931], that Hilbert’s original programme cannot be carried out – assuming
minimal conditions on a theory T, which hold for practically all theories with a nat-
ural encoding of the natural numbers (natural theories which have been considered
and do not fulfil these conditions are weaker than PRA, he could show that a con-
sistent theory T does not prove its own consistency. It follows that the consistency
of theories T with a natural embedding of PRA and which fulfil Go¨del’s conditions
cannot be shown by finitary means. Most natural theories except for extremely
weak ones fulfil the premise of the last sentence – Hilbert’s original programme had
failed.
Gentzen’s proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic. 1936 Gerhard
Gentzen [Gentzen, 1936] showed the consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA) using
transfinite induction up to ǫ0. This was the birth of ordinal theoretic proof theory.
PA is the extension of PRA by allowing induction over all (first-order) formulae.
(one often restricts the set of functions to addition, multiplication, successor function
and the constant zero however – the addition of all primitive-recursive functions is
conservative over that theory). Gentzen considered a primitive recursive ordinal
notation system up to ǫ0:
In set theory, an ordinal α is a set which is transitive and the elements of which
are transitive. Especially the elements of ordinals are ordinals. Let Ord be the
class of all ordinals. As usual, Greek letters will in the following refer to ordinals,
so e.g. ∀α.ϕ(α) stands for ∀x ∈ Ord.ϕ(x). The relation ∈ on the class of ordinals
is a linear ordering, and one usually writes α < β for α ∈ β. < is well-founded,
i.e. for any formulae we have the principle of transfinite induction over ordinals:
(∀α.(∀β < α.ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α)) → ∀α.ϕ(α). An ordering which is both linear and
well-founded is called a well-ordering. The union of a set of ordinals A forms an
ordinal which is the supremum of the ordinals, therefore written as sup A. There is
a standard definition of addition, multiplication and exponentiation of ordinals. All
natural numbers can be regarded as ordinals (using 0 = ∅ and α+1 = {α}∪α) and
the set of natural numbers forms an ordinal ω, which is the least infinite ordinal.
Every ordinal α is either 0, a successor ordinal, i.e. of the form β + 1, or a limit
ordinal, which means that ∀β < α.∃γ < α.β < γ. Furthermore, for every ordinal
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α there exists an k ∈ N and unique α ≥ α1 > · · · > αk and ni ∈ N s.t. ni > 0
and α = ωα1 · n1 + · · · + ω
αk · nk (here we use the just mentioned operations of
addition, multiplication and exponentiation on ordinals). If the expression on the
right fulfils the previous conditions on αi and ni, it is called the Cantor Normal Form
CNF of α. One can show that the ordering on ordinals in CNF is the lexicographic
ordering: If α = ωα1 · n1 + · · · + ω
αk · nk, β = ω
β1 · m1 + · · · + ω
βl · ml are the
CNFs of α, β, then α < β iff ((α1, n1), . . . , (αk, nk)) < ((β1,m1), . . . , (βl,ml)) with
respect to the lexicographic ordering on pairs and descending sequences: one forms
first the lexicographic ordering on pairs (α, n) s.t. α ∈ Ord and n ∈ N, and then
the lexicographic ordering on descending sequences of such pairs. We will use this
property in appendix A in a direct well-foundedness proof for the ordinal notation
system up to ǫ0. An ordinal α which has a CNF with ordinal coefficients αi < α can
be considered to be constructed using CNF from smaller ordinals, and ǫ0 is the least
ordinal which does not have this property. It can be defined as ǫ0 = sup{ω
ω·
·
·
1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
| n ∈
ω}. One can easily show that ǫ0 = ω
ǫ0 .
An ordinal notation system is a pair (OT, <OT) consisting of a set OT ⊆ N
and a primitive relation <OT⊆ OT
2, such that <OT is linear and well-founded,
i.e. the principle of transfinite induction over OT holds with respect to all sets:
∀X ⊆ N.(∀x ∈ OT.(∀y ∈ OT.y <OT x → y ∈ X) → x ∈ X) → OT ⊆ X. We
will write < instead of <OT, if it will be clear from the context, whether < or <OT
is meant by <. (OT, <) is primitive recursive, if both OT and < are primitive
recursive. In a context, in which only natural numbers and one ordinal notation
system are mentioned, one writes Greek letters for elements of OT using the same
convention as before – e.g. ∀β.ϕ(β) stands for ∀x ∈ OT.ϕ(x).
Now it is easy to introduce an ordinal notation system based on CNF: One en-
codes sequences of natural numbers (n1, . . . , nk) as natural numbers 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, and
defines simultaneously inductively OTǫ0 and <ǫ0⊆ OTǫ0×OTǫ0 as follows: If k ∈ N,
a1, . . . , ak ∈ OTǫ0 , ak <ǫ0 · · · <ǫ0 a1, ni > 0 then 〈〈a1, n1〉, . . . , 〈ak, nk〉〉 ∈ OTǫ0 . (In
the special case k = 0 we obtain 〈〉 representing 0). 〈〈a1, n1〉, . . . , 〈ak, nk〉〉
<ǫ0 〈〈b1,m1〉, . . . , 〈bk,mk〉〉, if the underlying sequences are in this order with re-
spect to lexicographic ordering on pairs 〈a, n〉 ∈ OTǫ0 × N and lexicographic or-
dering on sequences formed from such pairs, which reduces to the underlying or-
dering. It is a standard exercise (assuming a standard properties of the encod-
ing of sequences of natural numbers as natural numbers) to show that (OTǫ0 , <ǫ0)
forms a linear ordering which is primitive-recursive. Using set theory one can eas-
ily show that it is well-founded, by defining an embedding o of OTǫ0 into Ord by
o(〈〈a1, n1〉, . . . , 〈ak, nk〉〉) = ω
o(a1) · n1 + · · · + ω
o(ak) · nk, and by then showing that
a <ǫ0 b ⇔ o(a) < o(b). We will, as usual in proof theory, identify ordinal nota-
tions with the ordinals they denote, and write ωa1 · n1 + · · · + ω
ak · nk instead of
〈〈a1, n1〉, . . . , 〈ak, nk〉〉, if there is no confusion.
In Appendix A we will sketch a direct well-foundedness proof of the ordinal
system of strength ǫ0 – more precisely, we show that for every n the restriction
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of OTǫ0 to ordinals less than ω
ω·
·
·
1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
is well-founded. By Meta-induction on n, this
argument can be formulated directly in Peano Arithmetic, and therefore we can
show for (Meta-)every b < ǫ0 transfinite induction over OTǫ0 restricted to ordinals
less than b. The first proof carried out in PA we could find was in Hilbert/Bernays
([Hilbert and Bernays, 1939], §5, 3c). However we cannot show in PA that the
union is well-founded, provided PA is consistent. This follows from Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem and the fact that PRA plus the principle of transfinite
induction over (OTǫ0 , <ǫ0) proves the consistency of PA (therefore PA plus this
principle proves the consistency as well), as shown by Gentzen using cut elimination:
Cut elimination. We will in the following give a modern version (in this compact
form essentially due to Buchholz) of Gentzen’s proof of the consistency of PA in PRA
extended by quantifier free transfinite induction up to ǫ0. First one can embed proofs
of closed formulae of Peano arithmetic into a semi-formal system, i.e. a system of
proof rules having rules with infinitely many premises, which we call PAstar:
We take as set of formulae those constructed from prime formulae and negated
prime formulae using ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃. The negation for non-prime formulae is defined
by the deMorgan rules, e.g. ¬(P (x) ∧ Q(x)) := (¬P (x)) ∨ (¬Q(x)). Similarly we
define A→ B := ¬A ∨B.
PA∗ is a Tait-style sequent calculus. Here sequents Γ, ∆ are sets of formulae
{A1, . . . , An}, with the intended meaning being A1 ∨ · · · ∨An. Especially the empty
sequent, denoted by ∅, stands for falsity. One writes Γ, A for Γ ∪ {A} and Γ,∆ for
Γ ∪ ∆. In PA∗ one derives closed sequents Γ, i.e. sequents such that the formulae
don’t contain any free variables.
The basic rules of the system are introduction rules for the logical connectives.
Γ, A is an axiom, if A is a true prime formula. Furthermore, we have the following
rules:
Γ, A Γ, B
Γ, A ∧B
Γ, A
Γ, A ∨B
Γ, B
Γ, A ∨B
Γ, A(0) Γ, A(1) Γ, A(2) · · ·
Γ,∀x.A(x)
Γ, A(t)
Γ,∃x.A(x)
Note that ∀-introduction has infinitely many premises. The main formula in the
conclusion of any rule (e.g. A ∧B in the ∧-introduction rule) can be an element of
Γ and therefore occur in the premise as well.
One can easily show that, if Γ is derivable, so is Γ,∆. Therefore we can omit
formulae in the premises of a rule which are not needed (e.g. if Γ, A and B are
provable, then Γ, A∧B is provable, since from a proof of B we can obtain a proof of
the second premise Γ, B of the ∧-introduction rule). We will therefore in derivations
omit unnecessary formulae in sequents.
Additionally to the above rules, we add the cut rule and for technical purposes
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the repetition rule, which does not do anything (essentially due to Mints):
Γ, A Γ,¬A
Γ
Γ
Γ
In the cut rule, A is called the cut-formula. If one allows non-well-founded proofs,
i.e. proofs with infinite chains Γ1,Γ2, . . . s.t. Γ1 is the conclusion and Γi+1 is a
premise of Γi, one can derive everything in this theory: derive Γ from Γ using the
repetition rule, which is again derived from Γ etc. (Without the repetition rule
one can instead apply any other rule applicable to the premise repetitively). Proofs
without infinitely descending chains are called well-founded. Positively, one can
define the set of well-founded proofs as the least set of proofs, such that if there are
derivations di of Γi (i ∈ I) in this set and a rule deriving Γ from Γi(i ∈ I) then the
derivation
di
· · · Γi · · · (i ∈ I)
Γ
is in this set.
Without using the cut- and repetition rule one can derive A,¬A by induction
on the built-up of formulae. For prime formulae this is clear (since either A or ¬A
is true), and for instance in case A = B ∧ C (note that ¬(A ∧ B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B) this
follows by:
A,¬A
A,¬A ∨ ¬B
B,¬B
B,¬A ∨ ¬B
A ∧B,¬A ∨ ¬B
Elimination rules for the logical connectives are provable using the cut rule. For
instance, the proof that from Γ, A ∧ B we can derive Γ, A is as follows (note that
¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B):
Γ, A ∧B
¬A,A
¬A ∨ ¬B,A
(Cut)
Γ, A
Interpretation of PA into PA∗. We show, by induction over the derivation,
that if a sequent Γ is derivable in PA depending on free variables x1, . . . , xk, then
for all n1, . . . , nk ∈ N the sequent Γ[x1 := n1, . . . , xk := nk] is derivable in PA
∗. Here
Γ[x1 := n1, . . . , xk := nk] denotes the result of substituting in all formulas in Γ the
variables xi by ni. We consider some of the more important cases:
Case Γ is an axiom of PA: All instances of defining equations for primitive-
recursive functions are true prime formulae, and therefore axioms in PA∗. The
equality axioms can be written as sequents of prime formulae (e.g. x = y → y = x
can be rewritten as x 6= y, y = x), and then each instantiation is an axiom of PA∗
(if we substitute x by n and y by m in x 6= y, y = x, then we get n 6= m,m = n
and either n 6= m or m = n is true, hence an axiom). One minor problem is the
transfer principle x = y → A(x) → A(y) for arbitrary formulae A. One can easily
see that, from the transfer principle restricted to prime formulae and negated prime
Proof theory of martin-lo¨f theory. An overview 67
formulae A one can prove using logical rules only the transfer principle for arbitrary
formulae, so we can restrict in PA the principle to (negated) prime formulae. If we
rewrite the transfer principle for (negated) prime formulae as x 6= y,¬A(x), A(y),
we get a sequent, such that every instance is an axiom of PA∗.
Case Γ is derived from logical rules: The introduction rules for ∧ and ∨
follow from the corresponding rules of PA∗, and the elimination rules are derivable,
as we have seen above. We consider the case of ∀-introduction: Assume that Γ =
∆,∀x.A(x), which is derived from ∆, A(x), where x is not free in ∆. Assume for
simplicity that x is the only free variable in ∆, A(x). Then by induction hypothesis
we know that we can show ∆, A(n) for all n, and obtain therefore the following proof
of ∆,∀x.A(x):
∆, A(0) ∆, A(1) · · ·
∆,∀x.A(x)
The case of an introduction rule for ∃ is similar.
Induction: We haven’t specified precisely yet, how to formulate the induction
principle in PA, and for our purposes the easiest way is to use the induction rule
∆, A(0) ∆,∀x(A(x)→ A(x+ 1))
∆,∀x.A(x)
Assume that Γ = ∀x.A(x) is derived by the above rule, and for simplicity assume that
∆ is empty. By induction hypothesis, we have proofs in PA∗ of A(0) and ∀x(A(x)→
A(x+1)). From ∀x(A(x)→ A(x+1)), which is the same as ∀x(¬A(x)∨A(x+1)), we
obtain, using the fact that elimination for ∀ is derivable, a proof of ¬A(n), A(n+1)
as follows (note that ¬(¬A(n) ∨ A(n+ 1)) = A(n) ∧ ¬A(n+ 1)):
∀x(¬A(x) ∨ A(x+ 1))
¬A(n) ∨ A(n+ 1)
A(n),¬A(n) ¬A(n+ 1), A(n+ 1)
A(n) ∧ ¬A(n+ 1),¬A(n), A(n+ 1)
(Cut)
¬A(n), A(n+ 1)
Now we obtain proofs in PA∗ of A(n) for all n as follows:
A(0) ¬A(0), A(1)
A(1) ¬A(1), A(2)
A(2)
·
·
·
A(n)
Using the introduction rule for ∀ we obtain therefore a proof of ∀x.A(x) as follows
(note that the proof of A(n) has height at least n):
A(0) A(1) A(2) · · ·
∀x.φ(x)
Since the proof of the nth premise has height at least n, the proof of ∀x.A(x) has
infinite height.
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Every well-founded set can be linearised, and the resulting well-ordered set is
order isomorphic to the set of ordinals, and therefore the height of infinite proofs
can be measured by ordinals. One writes ⊢αn Γ for “Γ is provable in the system with
ordinal height at most α and cut rank < n”, where the rank n of a formula is a
natural number which measures the size of the formula (for instance the number of
connectives ∧,∨,∀,∃ in the formula), and the cut rank of a proof is the maximum
rank of all cut formulas, if it exists. So, if we have ⊢αini Γi for the premises Γi of a
rule with conclusion Γ, and if αi < α, ni ≤ n, and, in case we have a cut, if the rank
of the cut formula is < n, then ⊢αn Γ follows.
Every proof in Peano Arithmetic can now be interpreted in this system as a proof
of height < ω + ω and with finite cut rank. The main step in the consistency proof
is to prove cut elimination, i.e. that from a derivation of a sequent in this calculus
one obtains a cut-free derivation of the same sequent. As an example for how cut
elimination is carried out, consider the following derivation:
Γ, A ∧B,A Γ, A ∧B,B
Γ, A ∧B
Γ,¬A ∨ ¬B,¬A
Γ,¬A ∨ ¬B
Γ
This can be replaced by the following derivation, in which the original cut is reduced
by ones with smaller cut rank or same cut rank and smaller natural sum of the
heights of the subderivations:
Γ, A ∧B,A Γ,¬A ∨ ¬B
Γ, A
Γ,¬A ∨ ¬B,¬A Γ, A ∧B
Γ,¬A
Γ
By systematically carrying out reduction steps like the above, one can eventually
eliminate all cuts. More formally, one can show that from ⊢αn+1 Γ it follows ⊢
2α
n Γ.
Therefore we have that if Peano arithmetic proves falsity, i.e. the empty sequent,
then ⊢βn ∅ for β = 2
2·
·
ρ
︸︷︷︸
n times
for some ρ < ω + ω. It follows that β < ǫ0. Since a cut-free
proof of the empty sequent can only end by a repetition rule, it follows by transfinite
induction up to ǫ0 that there is no cut free proof of the empty sequent, and therefore
no proof of an inconsistency in Peano Arithmetic.
One can formulate the above argument in PRA extended by the principle of
transfinite induction up to ǫ0 over quantifier-free formulae. The most elegant proof
is due to Buchholz [Buchholz, 1991] (see as well [Michelbrink, 2000] for an extension
to Kripke-Platek set theory plus Π3-reflection). Buchholz introduces a primitive
recursive notation system for infinitary derivations as follows: He starts with a
notation system for proofs in Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, for each lemma in
the cut elimination proof he introduces a notation, which takes one or more infinitary
derivations corresponding to the assumptions of that lemma, and has as result an
infinitary derivation corresponding to the conclusion. Then he computes for every
notation the last formula, the last rule, the cut rank, the height, and notations
for the derivations of the premises. The notations for the subderivations might be
longer than that of the derivation itself. The functions computing these results are
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primitive-recursive, and one can show in PRA that the computed derivations of the
premises of a rule actually compute the premises of the last rule, have a smaller
height and that the condition on the cut rank is fulfilled. We need now quantifier-
free transfinite induction up to ǫ0 (and this is the only place where this principle is
needed) in order to show that there is no derivation of the empty sequent, i.e. that
PA is consistent. Note that in this proof the use of the principle of quantifier-free
transfinite induction up to ǫ0 is concentrated in the last step of the proof.
Proof-theoretic strength. It follows therefore that PRA plus transfinite induc-
tion up to ǫ0 proves the consistency of PA. Since PRA can be embedded into PA,
it follows that PA does not prove transfinite induction up to ǫ0. We have indicated
above that PA proves transfinite induction up to every ordinal less than ǫ0 (w.r.t.
the ordinal notation system we use). Therefore it follows that, for the ordinal no-
tation system chosen, ǫ0 is the supremum of all ordinals, up to which transfinite
induction can be shown.
One can obtain as well a sharper result, which refers to arbitrary ordinal notation
systems. It can be shown that, if we add to PA one free predicate symbol (i.e. a
symbol for a set X with no further axioms, but with all the logic and equality
rules and the principle of induction extended to formulas containing X), then the
supremum of the ordinals α, s.t. there exists an ordinal notation system of order
type α and we can prove transfinite induction w.r.t. the free predicate in it, is ǫ0.
For the above reasons, ǫ0 is called the proof theoretic strength of Peano Arith-
metic. Note that we were referring to two slightly different notions: one is referring
to the limit w.r.t. a canonical notation system. The other one refers to the principle
of transfinite induction for a new predicate X in an extended language, but w.r.t.
arbitrary ordinal notation systems. For most theories considered, both notations
coincide, and therefore the limit of transfinite induction provable in a theory T ,
understood in one of the two ways above, is called the proof theoretic strength |T |
of T .
In ordinal-theoretic proof theory, the techniques of Gentzen were extended fur-
ther and the strength of increasingly strong theories was developed. One open
question is what is meant by a canonical ordinal notation system, and one usually
uses the notion “natural ordinal notation system”. No conclusive answer has been
found, and it might be in principal impossible to characterise all natural ordinal
notation systems – if one has a mathematical precise notation, it is likely that one
can diagonalise over it and then find a ordinal notation system, which is intuitively
natural, but not covered by the definition. However, the standard ordinal notation
systems used in ordinal theoretic analyses are regarded in general as natural ones,
and it might be that this is the right approach to the notion of naturalness: to
develop strong ordinal notation systems and investigate afterwards, whether they
can be regarded as natural ones.
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3. A PROOF-THEORETIC PROGRAMME
A foundational programme. What Gentzen has achieved, is to reduce the con-
sistency of Peano Arithmetic to the principle of transfinite induction up to ǫ0. The
well-foundedness proof up to ǫ0 is very perspicuous, and this gives strong evidence
to the fact that PA is consistent. This proof together with other analyses of PA has
contributed to the fact that not many people nowadays still have doubts about the
consistency of PA, even so we cannot prove that fact.
In ordinal theoretic proof theory increasingly strong theories were analysed,
with increasingly complicated ordinal notation systems. The corresponding well-
foundedness proofs became less and less perspicuous. Although by Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem, a real reduction of the principles needed in order to prove
the consistency of a theory is not possible, one could at least hope for a reduction
to principles which are more evident. By carrying out an ordinal analysis alone that
has not necessarily been achieved – what one obtains is the concentration of the
consistency strength to the well-ordering of an ordinal notation system. Therefore
the author believes that the determination of the proof theoretic strength should
only be a first step in a proof theoretic analysis. A second step is required, namely to
develop theories, in which we can prove the well-foundedness of the ordinal notation
system and therefore (assuming that PRA can be embedded into those theories)
the consistency of the theories involved. And such theories should be formulated in
such a way that in every proof step of such a theory there is direct evidence that
the truth of the premises implies the truth of the conclusion. This insight needs
to be, because of Go¨del’s theorem, a philosophical argument. If such an analysis
has been carried out, we know that everything derived in such a theory is correct.
Such theories will then be a substitute for Hilbert’s finitary methods, we can call
them extended finitary methods. The up to now most successful theories used for
this purpose seem to be extensions of Martin-Lo¨f type theory, and the philosophi-
cal argument are meaning explanations as given by Per Martin-Lo¨f. An alternative
approach taken have been Feferman’s theories of explicit mathematics, but unfortu-
nately up to now only partial philosophical analyses have been carried out for those
theories. In the following, we will discuss how strong extensions of type theory are
developed and how the corresponding reductions are carried out. However, in this
article we will not investigate meaning explanations in detail.
Applications. Philosophical reasons are one motivation for following the pro-
gramme described. Another major motivation for it comes from applications.
Martin-Lo¨f type theory can be considered as a functional programming language,
and there exists one fully developed functional language, Cayenne [1] based on de-
pendent types. When considering Martin-Lo¨f type theory as it stands, we already
have data structures available which do not occur in other languages or are not
often used there: we have the W-type, which represents infinitely branching trees
(instances of this type can be represented in other languages, it is only when we
want to introduce the W-type as a general concept that we need dependent types),
and we have universes, which are types, the elements of which represent types. Both
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principles increase the strength of type theory substantially, and this is one of the
reasons, why they were added. When investigating strong extensions of type theory,
which allow to prove the well-foundedness of strong ordinal notation systems, we
are searching for new data types, which we hope will be of use in general program-
ming as well. One result of this programme is the development of the data type of
inductive-recursive definitions (see Section 7.), which uses principles developed first
in the context of the Mahlo universe as part of this programme.
4. TYPE THEORY WITH W-TYPE AND ATOM
One step in this proof theoretic programme was the proof theoretic analysis of the
theory ML1W of Martin-Lo¨f type theory with one standard universe and one W-
type by the author ([Setzer, 1993], [Setzer, 1998]). Independently, E. Griffor and M.
Rathjen [Griffor and Rathjen, 1994] have analysed a slightly weaker theory, which
has one standard universe closed under the W-type, and additionally Aczel’s type V
of iterated sets, but in which the formation of the W-type is restricted to elements
of the universe only. Both theories do not include the logical framework, so there
is no type Set and there are no judgements of the form A : Set or A = B : Set. In
our analysis, we obtained an upper bound for the proof theoretic strength of ML1W
with extensional equality, and proved the lower bound for ML1W with intensional
equality. Since both bounds coincide, this showed that both theories have the same
strength.
In this section we make a first step towards this result, and consider the strength
of type theory with W-type and a microscopic universe atom. In the Sect. 5. we
will then look at the full theory.
The W-type. The assumptions for forming the W-type are A : Type and x : A⇒
B(x) : Type, from which one can form (Wx : A.B(x)) : Type. (When writing B(x)
we mean that B might depend on x, and that later on B(r) means the result of
substituting x by r in B.) Its canonical elements are introduced by the following
introduction rule:
Γ⇒ r : A Γ⇒ s : B(r)→ (Wx : A.B(x))
Γ⇒ sup(r, s) : (Wx : A.B(x))
An element sup(r, s) of Wx : A.B(x) is a tree with label r and subtrees s(b) for
b : B(r). The elements of Wx : A.B(x) are therefore trees with branching degrees
(B(a))a:A. They can be visualised as follows (assume in this picture that B(r
′′) is
empty, therefore sup(r′′, s′′) has no subtrees s′′(y) for y : B(r′′)):
no subtrees
s′(c′) · · · s′(c) = sup(r′′, s′′)
s(b′) · · · s(b) = sup(r′, s′)
sup(r, s)
b′c
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The elimination rule for the W-type formalises induction over trees, which ex-
presses that we have the “least type closed under the introduction rule”, and that
therefore elements of Wx : A.B(x) are well-founded trees.
In standard models of the Wx : A.B(x), one can define the height height(t) of a
tree t, which is an ordinal, inductively as follows: height(sup(r, s)) = sup{s(b) + 1 |
b ∈ B′(b)}, where B′(b) is the interpretation of B(x) for x = b. The height of
Wx : A.B(x) (in a standard model) is defined as the supremum of the heights of its
elements (in a standard model).
Finite types. In all type theories which we will consider in this article, we have
types with finitely many elements, which we denote for the sake of simplicity by
{0, 1, . . . , n − 1} (or ∅ in case of n = 0). (The real type theoretic notation is Nn,
having elements called ik or A
k
i .) For the sake of readability, we sometimes write
False for ∅ (the formula with no proof), True for {0} (the formula with exactly one
proof), tt for the element of True, Bool for {0, 1}, and true, false for the elements
of Bool.
Atom and the type theory MLWatom. We add a type constructor atom with
typing x : Bool ⇒ atom(x) : Type to our type theory, together with equality rules
atom(true) = True and atom(false) = False. So atom takes a Boolean value and
translates it into a formula corresponding to its value.
When looking later at universes, we will see that we have here the case of a
microscopic universe Bool with two elements representing True and False. Without
any universe at all one can show that one can model type theory in such a way that
the interpretation of a type A(x) does not depend on x. If we interpret in such a
model Wx : A.B(x) in a standard way, then we have that the interpretation of B(x)
is either empty for all x, or non-empty for all x. If B(x) is empty for all x, then trees
have no subtrees, hence have height 0. If the interpretation of B(x) is non-empty
for all x, the interpretation of Wx : A.B(x) is empty, since in order to form an
element sup(r, s), we need to have defined before s(y) : (Wx : A.B(x)) for one of
the elements y of B(x). In both cases, the height of Wx : A.B(x) is 0. Type theory
without a universe is known to be very weak – it does not even show Peano’s fourth
axiom, namely that in the type N of natural numbers, 0 is different from S(n).
We call the type theory having standard types, atom, and the W-type, MLWatom.
Admissibles and ℵrecα . In order to understand the strength of type theories in-
volving the W-type, we need the notion of recursively regular or (an equivalent
name) admissible ordinals, a notion originating from generalised computability the-
ory. Classical computability is the theory of computable functions, where com-
putable means computable by any mechanical device. There, one has developed a
schema for defining so called partial recursive functions f : Nn
∼
→ N. Partial as
expressed by the symbol
∼
→ means that f : dom(f)→ N for some set dom(f) ⊆ Nn.
Recursive functions are total partial recursive functions, i.e. functions f : Nn
∼
→ N
s.t. dom(f) = Nn. One assumes that the set of partial recursive functions coincides
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with the set of computable functions. Note that computable is not a mathemati-
cal notion, therefore the fact that all computable functions are partial recursive is
not a mathematical statement and can therefore not be proved – however, most re-
searchers believe that all computable functions are partial recursive. One can encode
partial recursive functions as natural numbers, and writes f = {e}n, if f : Nn
∼
→ N
has code e.
In generalised computability theory, one extends the schema for defining partial
recursive functions to ordinals, and obtains the notion of κ-partial recursive functions
f : κn
∼
→ κ (where κ is an ordinal). For a detailed description, see for instance
Chapter VIII of [Hinman, 1978]. f : α → κ is κ-recursive in parameters < κ, if
f = λγ.g(γ, β0, . . . , βn−1) for some βi < κ and κ-partial recursive g : κ
n+1 → κ, and
if f(γ) is defined for all γ < α. A limit ordinal κ is admissible, if it is closed under
the formation of suprema of κ-recursive functions in parameters < κ: If α < κ and
f : α→ κ is κ-recursive in parameters < κ, then supγ<α f(γ) < κ.
One defines now by recursion on the ordinal α ordinals ℵrecα as follows: ℵ
rec
0 = ω,
the least infinite ordinal and least admissible ordinal; ℵrecα+1 is the least admissible
ordinal above ℵrecα ; and if λ is a limit ordinal, then ℵ
rec
λ = supβ<λ ℵ
rec
β . Usually, for
limit ordinals λ, ℵrecλ is not an admissible; but ℵ
rec
0 and ℵ
rec
α+1 are admissible. Every
admissible ordinal is of the form ℵrecα for some α.
Admissible ordinals are the recursive analogue of regular cardinals. An ordinal
κ is a regular cardinal, if κ is not the supremum of β < κ many ordinals < κ: There
exists no β < κ and f : β → κ s.t. κ = supα<β f(α). Note that here f can be
arbitrary, whereas for admissibles it had to be recursive, having parameters < κ.
Admissibles and the W-type. The heights of W-types are closely related to
admissible ordinals. Assume, that terms are encoded as natural numbers and assume
a standard interpretation A′ of A and of B(x) for x ∈ A′ as B′(x), where A′ and
B′(x) are sets of natural numbers encoding the elements of this type. (A rough idea
would be to interpret N as N and A→ B as {e | ∀x ∈ A′.{e}(x) ∈ B′}. The detailed
model is more complicated – in fact, more precisely one has to take equality of terms
into account and interpret a type as a set of pairs of natural numbers, where a pair
(n,m) being an element of the interpretation of A means that n and m are codes for
equal elements of A). Then the standard interpretation of Wx.A.B(x) is the least
set C s.t., if k ∈ A′ and ∀l ∈ B′(k).{e}1(l) ∈ C, then π(k, e) ∈ C. Here π : N2 → N
is the standard encoding of pairs of natural numbers as natural numbers. So C is
the least set of recursive trees with branching degrees B′(k) for k ∈ A′.
If we take A = {0, 1} and B(0) = ∅, B(1) = {0} and let O0 := (Wx :
A.B(x)), we can see that the elements of the interpretation of O0 are of the form
sup(1, λx. sup(1, λx. sup(1, · · · sup(0, λx.e)) · · ·))) (more precisely, they are equal mod-
ulo the η-rule to such a tree). These trees have heights n for n ∈ ω, so (the standard
interpretation of) O0 has height ω = ℵ
rec
0 , the least admissible ordinal.
If we take A = {0, 1, 2} and B(2) = O0, otherwise B(x) as before, we obtain
Kleene’s O (in the usual definition, one has B(2) = N instead of O0), which has
height ℵrec1 , the second admissible ordinal.
In general, the nth admissible ordinal ℵrecn is the height of (the standard inter-
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pretation of) On := Wx : {0, 1, . . . , n + 1}.B(x), where B(0) = ∅, B(1) = {0},
B(k) = Ok−2 for k > 1.
We can obtain a more uniform version of this, by replacing B(0) by O−2 := Wx :
∅.B(x), which is empty, and by replacing B(1) by O−1 := Wx : {0}.B(x), where
B(0) = O−2, which contains only trees of height 0. Then we obtain On = Wk :
{0, . . . , n+ 1}.Ok−2 for n ≥ −2.
Lower bound for |MLWatom|. Using the admissibles (ℵ
rec
n )n∈ω, one can form an
ordinal notation system. The ordinal notations will be terms for expressions formed
from 0, some standard operations on ordinals, and so called collapsing function ψκ
for κ > ω admissible, mapping ordinals to ordinals < κ. We won’t introduce ψκ in
detail. ψκ collapses ordinals into the interval [0, κ[ and is weakly monotone (α <
β → ψκ(α) ≤ ψκ(β)). Ordinal notation systems like this are usually constructed
using regular cardinals instead of admissibles, but with some extra work, which has
been carried out in some cases (e.g. [Schlu¨ter]), one can see that one can replace
those regular cardinals by their recursive analogues. One can simulate now these
functions by replacing ordinals by elements of On and then show that the type theory
in question proves transfinite induction up to ψℵrec
1
(ℵrecn ), which in the limit reaches
ψℵrec
1
(ℵrecω ). This provides a lower bound for this theory. Details for the lower bound
of a closely related type theory can be found in [Setzer, 1994].
Kripke-Platek set theory. For an upper bound, one interprets type theory into
an extension of Kripke-Platek set theory, which we will introduce in the following.
This will show that the formation of On essentially exhausts the strength of type
theory with W-type and a microscopic universe.
Kripke-Platek set theory KP is a weak version of set theory, which is closely
connected to admissibles. It was developed by Kripke [Kripke, 1964] and Platek
[Platek, 1966]. KP is obtained from standard ZF-set theory essentially as follows:
one omits the existence of the power set of any set; one omits the infinity axiom,
claiming the existence of an infinite set; one restricts the formation of {x ∈ a | ϕ(x)}
to ∆0-formulae ϕ (i.e. formulae in which all quantifiers are bounded, i.e. of the
form ∀x ∈ a or ∃x ∈ a) – the corresponding principle is called ∆0-separation; one
restricts the so called collection principle expressing that if ∀x ∈ a.∃y.ϕ(x, y) then
there exists a b s.t. ∀x ∈ a.∃y ∈ b.ϕ(x, y) to ∆0-formulae ϕ – the new principle is
correspondingly called ∆0-collection. The precise axiomatisation can be found in
the detailed monograph [2] on Kripke-Platek set theory.
The relationship to admissible ordinals is as follows: There exists an operation
(called constructible hierarchy) which maps ordinals α to sets Lα, where L0 = ∅,
Lλ =
⋃
α<λ Lα for λ limit ordinal, and Lα+1 is the result of applying certain opera-
tions for forming new sets (such as forming pairs, unions of sets or the domain and
range of relations) to sets in Lα ∪ {Lα}. Now one can show that Lα is a model of
KP iff α is admissible, and introduce a notion of “admissible set” (as opposed to
“admissible ordinal”), which holds for a set iff it is of the form Lα for an admissible
α.
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KP in Proof Theory. In proof theory, extensions of KP by axioms claiming the
existence of many admissibles are often used as reference theories (see especially
the monograph [Ja¨ger, 1986]). More precisely, one adds a predicate Ad(x) standing
for “x is an admissible set”, axioms stating that Ad(x) implies that x is a model
of KP, and axioms claiming the existence of elements fulfilling this predicate (for
instance a fixed number of admissibles, arbitrarily finitely many admissibles, or
axioms claiming the existence of admissibles closed under certain operations). Many
of these extensions have been analysed proof theoretically, and are used as reference
theories. The strength of other theories is usually obtained by comparing them with
those reference theories.
General Technique for Developing Upper Bounds of Martin-Lo¨f Type
Theory. Our standard technique for determining upper bounds for the strength
of variants of Martin-Lo¨f type theories is to model them in extensions of KP having
the same proof-theoretic strength. Assume that we have done this for a variant
of type theory called MLTTvar and a variant of KP called KPvar. Then the above
provides us with a model of MLTTvar in a set theory of minimal strength. The
main purpose for developing this model is to obtain an upper bound for the proof
theoretic strength of MLTTvar. We will be able to show using this model that, if
MLTTvar proves transfinite induction up to a certain ordinal (more precisely up to
an ordinal notation), then the same holds for KPvar. Therefore |MLTTvar| ≤ |KPvar|.
If the variants of KP chosen have been analysed proof theoretically, one obtains a
concrete ordinal α = |KPvar|, and we have |MLTTvar| ≤ α.
Note that KP and its extensions are classical theories and therefore not construc-
tive. However, apart from the proof theoretic result, which measures the strength of
the theory, we believe that modelling a theory in a set theory of minimal strength
provides additional insight into what can be achieved in type theory. Furthermore,
once we have shown the other direction, i.e. that |MLTTvar| ≥ α = |KPvar|, one can
easily show that MLTTvar shows the consistency of approximations of KPvar, such
that each proof in KPvar can be formalised in one of these approximations. This
provides us with a constructive understanding of KPvar.
A more refined analysis often shows as well that MLTTvar and KPvar show the
same arithmetic Π2-sentences, i.e. the same formulae ∀x ∈ N.∃y ∈ N.ϕ(x, y), where
ϕ(x, y) is a quantifier-free arithmetic formula. Such formulae can be considered as
the specifications of programs, and from each proof of such a formula in MLTTvar
one obtains a program computing a function f : N → N s.t. ∀x ∈ N.ϕ(x, f(x))
holds. So one can say that the provably total programs in KPvar and MLTTvar
coincide.
Upper bound for |MLWatom|. In MLWatom, we can define On, which corresponds
to the possibility of forming finitely many admissible, and we claimed that this es-
sentially exhausts the strength of this theory. A variant of Kripke-Platek set theory,
which allows to form finitely many admissibles, is the theory KPl. Its standard
model is Lℵrecω . ℵ
rec
ω is not an admissible, so the standard model of KPl doesn’t fulfil
the axioms KP, and we can’t include all axioms of KP into those of KPl. What is
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omitted is that the set theoretic universe fulfils ∆0-collection – however, restricted
to any a s.t. Ad(a), ∆0-collection will hold. Further one demands that every set is
contained in an admissible set. So we can form a sequence Ad0 = ∅, and Adn+1 as
being one admissible above Adn for Meta-n ∈ ω, but without ∆0-collection it is not
possible to form this sequence inside the theory. If one could, then one could form
Adω :=
⋃
n∈ω Adn and hence an admissible above Adω.
One can now form a model of MLWatom in KPl. Essentially, we interpret each
type A(x) as an element of Adn for some n uniformly for all x. The main step is to
interpret Wx : A.B(x). If A and B′(x) are interpreted as A′ and B′(x), which are
elements of Adn, and if κ is the supremum of the ordinals in Adn, then Wx : A.B(x)
is interpreted by iterating a certain operator (which forms trees with subtrees having
been formed before) κ many times. The result is an element of Adn+1.
In general, in order to obtain a fixed point of such kind of operators (more
precisely Σ1-operators), we need to iterate the operator up to an admissible ordinal
corresponding to the least admissible set containing all set parameters used by this
operator.
5. TYPE THEORY WITH W-TYPE AND ONE UNIVERSE
In this section we consider the theory ML1W, which is Martin-Lo¨f type theory with
W-type and a universe closed under the W-type.
Universes and the type theory ML1W. A universe is the type theoretic for-
malisation of a type the elements of which are types. This suggests that a universe
should be a type U, s.t. for x : U we have x : Type, as in so called “universes a`
la Russell”. However, this causes conceptual problems, since in this step a term x
becomes a type, and changes therefore its category. (Note that in a term model, a
term is interpreted by itself, whereas a type is interpreted for instance as a set of
terms; something similar happens in meaning explanations.) In order to avoid such
conceptual problems (note that Martin-Lo¨f type theory is considered as well as a
foundation of mathematics), it is better to keep terms and types separted and work
with “universes a` la Tarski”: a universe is a type U, the elements of which are codes
for types. We need therefore an additional decoding function T, the typing of which
is giving by the judgement x : U⇒ T(x) : Type. If x is an element of U, i.e. a code
for type, T(x) is the type, x denotes.
The microscopic universe atom introduced in Sect. 4. is a universe in this sense:
the underlying set is Bool and the decoding function is atom: we have x : Bool ⇒
atom(x) : Set.
A standard universe U is a universe closed under all standard type constructions.
This means for instance that there is a code N̂ : U (i.e. a constructor N̂ of U) for
the type N of natural numbers, so T(N̂) = N. Similarly, we have codes for the
types {0, . . . , l − 1}. Standard universes are closed under +, Π, Σ, so for instance
we have that, if r : U, and s is s.t. x : T(r) ⇒ s(x) : U, then (Σ̂x : r.s(x)) : U and
T(Σ̂x : r.s(x)) = Σx : T(r).T(s(x)) for a constructor Σ̂ of U.
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ML1W has now the standard types, the W-type and a standard universe U,
which is closed additionally under the W-type: if r and s(x) are as for the premises
of the Σ̂-introduction rule above, then (Ŵx : r.s(x)) : U and T(Ŵx : r.s(x)) = Wx :
T(r).T(s(x)) for a constructor Ŵ of U.
Strength of ML1W. We will in this section provide some intuition concerning the
strength of ML1W, more details can be found in Appendix B. In the presence of a
universe closed under the W-type, we can define by induction on n : N codes Ôn : U
for the finitely iterated trees On, and therefore form Oω+1 := Wx : N.T(Ôn), which
is a W-type of height ℵrecω+1, the first admissible bigger than ℵ
rec
n for n ∈ ω. Oω+1 can
be represented by an element of U. We can iterate the above process as well over
any W-type which has a code in U. By iterating it over W1 := O1, we can form trees
of height ℵrecα for α < ℵ
rec
1 , and then form a W-type W1 of height ℵ
rec
ℵrec
1
+1. Doing
the same with W2 instead of O1, we reach ℵ
rec
ℵrec
ℵrec
1
+1
+1 by a tree W3. Continuing this
process, we obtain W-types Wn for n ∈ ω, s.t. the supremum of their heights is
Λrec = supn∈ω ℵ
rec
ℵrec
ℵrec···1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. Λrec is the first (non-admissible) fixed point of λα.ℵrecα . Wn
can be formed as elements of U, and therefore we can form a W-type inside U, which
has as height the least admissible ℵrecΛrec+1 above Λ
rec. In general, if we have formed a
W-type of height α, then we can iterate the formation of Oγ for γ < α as elements
of U and form therefore a W-type of height ℵrecα+1. So the height of the W-types, we
can form as elements of U, must be an admissible κ, which is closed under λβ.ℵrecβ .
In order to obtain this is property, it suffices to demand that for every α < κ there
exists an admissible π s.t. α < π < κ, and admissibles with this property are called
recursively inaccessible ordinal. Admissible sets corresponding to such ordinals are
called recursively inaccessible sets. Recursively inaccessible ordinals are the recursive
analogue of strongly inaccessible cardinals. One can form a model of ZFC (Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with axiom of choice), s.t. the supremum of ordinals in this
model is the first strongly inaccessible cardinal, therefore the existence of strongly
inaccessible cardinals cannot be shown in ZFC.
So we have now obtained some intuition that we can form inside the universe
W-types, s.t. the supremum of their heights reaches (in the standard model) Irec,
the least recursively inaccessible ordinal. We can form further W-types on top of
U, which are no longer elements of U, and which have heights κn := ℵ
rec
Irec+n, the
nth admissible above Irec. We can do this only by Meta-induction over n, and the
supremum of the heights of W-types, we can form, is I+ := ℵrecIrec+ω = supn∈ω κn.
Upper bound for |ML1W|. An upper bound for the strength of ML1W can be
obtained by modelling it in a theory KPI+, which has standard model LI+ . In
KPI+ we have one recursively inaccessible set AdI, and constants for finitely many
admissibles above it. (Alternatively, one can define it as the theory KPl plus the
existence of one recursively inaccessible.) We can model U by iterating an operator
(which essentially forms new sets representing Ŵx : a.b(x), Σ̂x : a.b(x) etc. from
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sets previously defined). In order to reach a fixed point, we have to iterate this
operator up to Irec, which is the union of all ordinals in the recursively inaccessible
set AdI. If we form the representation of Wx : A.B(x) from sets A and B(x) s.t. A
and B(x) are elements of Lα, one can see that the representation of Wx : A.B(x) is
an element of Lα++ , where α
++ is the second admissible above α. A fixed point of
this operator is obtained if we iterate it up to an admissible, which is closed, in order
to accommodate for the formation of Wx : A.B(x), under the step from α to α++.
That’s why we need a recursively inaccessible ordinal, in order to reach the fixed
point. The interpretation of U is an element of Lκ1 . We can form W-types making
use of U and sets constructed from it, and each W-type construction corresponds
to iterating an operator up to the next admissible. An n-times nested W can be
interpreted by iterating an operator up to κn+1, and the interpretation is an element
of κn+2. This way we can model it in KPI
+.
A lower bound for |ML1W| can be obtained by carrying out a well-ordering
proof for an ordinal notation system which has the strength of KPI+. Details for
this proof can be found in Appendix B.
6. THE MAHLO UNIVERSE
In proof theory, the next major step taken after treating theories of strength KPI
was the analysis of KPM, Kripke Platek set theory plus the recursive Mahloness
of the set theoretic universe, by Michael Rathjen [Rathjen, 1991]. An ordinal M is
a recursively Mahlo ordinal, if it is admissible, and if for all f : M → M , which
are M -recursive with parameters in M , there exists an admissible κ < M s.t.
∀α < κ.f(α) < κ. If one replaces in this definition “admissible” by “recursively
inaccessible”, one obtains an equivalent definition. Recursively Mahlo sets are sets
of the form LM for recursively Mahlo ordinalsM . In order to extend dependent type
theory by a principle which reaches the strength of KPM, the author introduced in
[Setzer, 2000] a type theory with one Mahlo universe. This type theory is substan-
tially stronger than Martin-Lo¨f type theory extended by standard types (including
W-type and standard universes). We will in the following develop the rules for this
type theory from the definition of recursively Mahloness.
In order to translate the Mahlo principle into type theory, we replace M by a
family of types (V,T), i.e. we have V : Type and x : V⇒ T(x) : Type.
A recursively inaccessible ordinal corresponds in type theory to a standard uni-
verse, so we add rules expressing that (V,T) is closed under the universe construc-
tions and under the W-type.
The function f : M → M in the definition of recursively Mahloness can be
translated as having a function f : Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T), where Fam(V,T) :=
Σa : V.T(a)→ V is the set of families of sets in V.
The existence of a recursively inaccessible κ can be translated into the existence
of a subuniverse (Uf , sf ) of (V,T). This means that we have Uf : Type and sf :
Uf → V, which interprets each code in Uf as a code in V. For a : Uf we define
Sf (a) := T(sf (a)), which is the type corresponding to the code a.
Proof theory of martin-lo¨f theory. An overview 79
We demand that (Uf , Sf ) is a standard universe closed under the W-type, and
that codes for the standard universe constructions in Uf correspond to codes in V.
For instance, N˜ : Uf and sf (N˜) = N̂ for the code N̂ of N in V. sf : Uf → V can
now be lifted to a function sFamf : Fam(Uf , Sf ) → Fam(V,T), where s
Fam
f (〈x, y〉) =
〈sf (x), λy.sf (y(x))〉.
That ∀α < κ.f(α) < κ. will be interpreted as rules expressing that f :
Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T) is reflected by a function Res : Fam(Uf , Sf ) →
Fam(Uf , Sf ), i.e. sf ◦ Res = f ◦ sf . Res constructs new elements of Uf , and we
obtain corresponding constructors by splitting Res into two parts, namely Res0 :
Fam(Uf , Sf ) → Uf and Res1 : (x : Fam(Uf , Sf )) → Sf (Res0(x)) → Uf . So Res as
before is λx.〈Res0(x), λy.Res1(x, y)〉.
In type theory we split sf ◦ Res = f ◦ sf into two equality rules, one for
Res0, namely sf (Res0(〈x, y〉)) = π0(f(s
Fam
f (〈x, y〉))), and one for Res1, namely
sf (Res1(〈x, y〉, z)) = π1(f(s
Fam
f (〈x, y〉)))(z). Here π0, π1 stand for the first and
second projection.
Up to now the rules do not reach more strength than ML1W, since we could easily
model Uf := V and sf := λx.x. Strength is reached by modelling the condition that
κ ∈M . This can be modelled as the existence of a constructor Û with argument f of
V and the condition T(Ûf ) = Uf . Note that this means that V has now a constructor
which depends negatively on V, namely Û : (f : Fam(V,T)→ Fam(V,T))→ V.
In type theory, it is more natural to replace f : Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T) by
two functions f0 : (a : V, b : T(a) → V) → V and f1 : (a : V, b : T(a) →
V,T(f0(a, b)))→ V. In the same way, one replaces the type of Res0 by (a : Uf0,f1 , b :
Sf0,f1(a)→ Uf0,f1)→ Uf0,f1 , similarly for Res1. The type of 〈f0, f1〉 is (Fam(V,T)→
Fam(V,T))′ := ((a : V, b : T(a)→ V)→ V)× ((a : V, b : T(a)→ V,T(f0(a, b)))→
V). By ~f : (Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T))′ we mean in the following that 〈f0, f1〉 :
(Fam(V,T)→ Fam(V,T))′, similarly for ~g.
MLM denotes the type theory with W-type and one Mahlo universe.
Constructive understanding of the Mahlo universe. There are two ap-
proaches in order to get a constructive understanding of the Mahlo universe.
The first approach uses partial functions. In order to give meaning explanations,
we have to say what it means to be an element of the Mahlo universe, when two
elements of the Mahlo universe are equal, and we have to understand for every
element a of the Mahlo universe T(a) as a set. The understanding of the standard
constructors for the universe is as usual. For instance, if a is an element of the
Mahlo universe and for x in T(a), b is as well an element of it, then Σ̂x : a.b is an
element of the Mahlo universe, and T(Σ̂x : a.b) is defined as Σx : T(a).T(b). Here
we refer to the fact that we have understood already how to form from a set A and
a set B(x) depending on x : A the set Σx : A.B(x). Σ̂x : a.b and Σ̂x : a′.b′ are equal,
if a and a′ are equal, and if for x : T(a), b and b′ are equal.
In order to define, when Û~f is an element of the Mahlo universe, we intro-
duce sets U~f together with functions s~f : U~f → V for arbitrary terms
~f . Note
the reference to arbitrary terms. As an abbreviation, let in the following sFam~f :
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Fam(U~f , S~f ) → Fam(V,T) be defined as s
Fam
~f
(〈x, y〉) = 〈sf (x), λy.sf (y(x))〉. We
write loosely f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)) for f0(π0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)), π1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉))), similarly for
f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c).
By 〈a, b〉 being an element of Fam(U~f , S~f ) we mean that a is an element of U~f
and that for x in S~f (a) it follows that b x is an element of U~f .
First of all, we demand that U~f is closed under the usual universe constructions.
For instance, if a is an element of U~f , and for x in T(s~f (a)), b is an element of U~f ,
then Σ˜x : a.b is an element of U~f . Furthermore, s~f (Σ˜x : a.b) = Σ̂x : s~f (a), s~f (b), of
which we know already that it is an element of the Mahlo universe.
We demand as well that U~f is closed under
~f , provided ~f applied to the corre-
sponding elements in V has a result in V: Assume 〈a, b〉 is an element of Fam(U~f , S~f ).
Assume that f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉) is an element of the Mahlo universe. Then we reflect
this in U~f as an element Res0(a, b). So we demand that Res0(a, b) is an element of
U~f , and decode s~f (Res0(a, b)) = f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)).
Assume additionally c is an element of T(f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉))), and f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c)
is an element of the Mahlo universe. Then we reflect this in Uf and demand that
Res1(a, b, c) is an element of U~f and s~f (Res1(a, b, c)) = f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c). Note that
U~f depends on V.
Assume now U~f is closed under f , i.e. for every 〈a, b〉, which is an element of
Fam(U~f , S~f ) it is the case that f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)) is an element of the Mahlo universe,
and that for every c as above, f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c) is an element of V. Then we have
a complete understanding of U~f independently of any further elements added to V,
and we demand that Û~f is an element of V and T(Û~f ) = U~f .
Û~f and Û~g are equal iff for every element 〈a, b〉 of Fam(U~f , S~f ) we have that
f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)) and g0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)) are equal elements of V, and, if for every c in
T(f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉))) we have that f1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c) and g1(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉), c) are equal
elements of V. We observe it is correct to identify the two sets since U~f and U~g are
the same set, and therefore T(Û~f ) and T(Û~g) are equal.
We have to show now that V fulfils the rules for the Mahlo universe. Assume
~f : (Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T))′. Then it follows that U~f is closed under
~f in the
sense as stated above, and therefore Û~f : V. If
~f and ~g are equal elements of
(Fam(V,T) → Fam(V,T))′, then it follows that for a, b as above f0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉))
g0(s
Fam
~f
(〈a, b〉)) are equal, similarly for f1 and g1, and therefore Û~f and Û~g are equal.
The problem with this construction is that we need to refer to the collection of
all terms, and that we construct elements of the Mahlo universe, which we cannot
derive in the type theory, namely those elements Û~f , for which
~f is only total on
the restriction to the elements s~f (a) of V, but not on the whole of Fam(V,T). This
differs from ordinary meaning explanations, in which the rules are in one to one
correspondence with the explanations.
A second approach to a constructive understanding of the Mahlo universe is
directly in accordance with the rules for the Mahlo universe. However, up to now
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no mathematical precise model corresponding to it has been developed. Here we
understand the Mahlo universe as an open concept. The Mahlo universe is again
closed under the usual universe constructions. Assume now that we know from our
knowledge about the Mahlo universe up to now that it is closed under some function
~f in the sense of being a function from Fam(V,T) into itself (more precisely in the
sense of the primed version of the function space), independently of any further
elements to be added later, and therefore not assuming a complete knowledge about
V. Then we define U~f and s~f as before, and then Û~f is an element of the Mahlo
universe and T(Û~f ) = U~f . Assume now that, independent of any elements to be
added later to the Mahlo universe, ~f and ~g coincide as functions from Fam(V,T)
into itself. Then Û~f and Û~g are equal elements of V.
Inconsistency of Mahlo universe with elimination rules. Erik Palmgren dis-
covered in [Palmgren, 1998] that the Mahlo universe, extended by elimination rules,
is inconsistent. This was shown in the following way. Let C be any fixed element of
V. Let for 〈f0, f1〉 : (Fam(V) → Fam(V))
′, F↓(〈f0, f1〉) := λx.f0(x, λy.C) : V → V,
and for g : V → V, F↑(g) := 〈λx, y.g(x), λx, y, z.C〉 : (Fam(V) → Fam(V))
′.
Then we have F↓(F↑(g)) = g : V → V, so we have (in a trivial way) embed-
ded V → V into (Fam(V) → Fam(V))′. Let for 〈f0, f1〉 : (Fam(V) → Fam(V))
′
G↓(〈f0, f1〉) := Ûf0,f1 : V, and define, using the elimination rules of the Mahlo uni-
verse, G↑ : V → (Fam(V) → Fam(V))
′ s.t. G↑(Ûf0,f1) = 〈f0, f1〉. Then we have
G↑(G↓(〈f0, f1〉)) = 〈f0, f1〉, so we have embedded (Fam(V)→ Fam(V))
′ into V. De-
fine for f : V → V f− := G↓(F↑(f)) : V, and for v : V, v
+ := F↓(G↑(v)) : V → V.
Then we have (f−)+ = f : V→ V, so we have embedded V→ V into V. Now we can
interpret the untyped lambda-calculus into V by having as code for λ-abstraction
the expression λ̂x.t := (λx.t)−, and as code for the application of s to t the expres-
sion Âp(s, t) := s+(t). It is easy to verify that for s : V, x : V ⇒ t : V β-equality
holds: Âp(λ̂x.t, s) = t[x := s] : V. Now one defines as usual in the untyped lambda-
calculus the Y-combinator as Y := λ̂x.Âp(V, V ) where V := λ̂y.Âp(x, Âp(y, y)) and
one gets for a : V, Âp(Y, a) = Âp(a, Âp(Y, a)) : V. Let F̂alse be a code for False
in U. Let u := Âp(Y, λ̂x.x→̂F̂alse) : V. Then u = u→̂F̂alse : V and therefore with
A := T(u) A = A → False : Type. Now assuming a : A we obtain a : A → False
and therefore a(a) : False. This shows f := λa.a(a) : A → False and therefore
f(f) : False, so False is inhabited.
A model for the Mahlo universe and the upper bound for the proof-
theoretic strength. A Model for the Mahlo universe was introduced in [Setzer,
1996] and used in order to determine an upper bound for the proof theoretic strength
of the Mahlo universe, and to show the consistency relative to the corresponding set
theory. The model was constructed using KPM+ as Meta theory.
KPM+ is similar to KPI+ Kripke-Platek set theory plus the existence of one
admissible set AdM , for which the Mahlo axiom holds, i.e. if ∀x ∈ AdM.∃y ∈
AdM.ϕ(x, y) for some ∆0-formula ϕ, then there exists a b ∈ AdM, which is admissible,
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and such that ∀x ∈ b.∃y ∈ b.ϕ(x, y). Furthermore, similarly as for KPI+, we demand
that there exist finitely many admissibles above AdM. (Again one could alternatively
define KPM+ as KPl plus the existence of one recursively Mahlo ordinal.) One can
now model the Mahlo universe by iterating an operator up to M, which is the first
recursively Mahlo ordinal and the union of ordinals in AdM. That the universe
is closed under the Mahlo operation follows by the fact that we have iterated the
operator up to the first recursively Mahlo ordinal. More details about this model
can be found in Appendix C.
Lower Bound. The lower bound [Setzer, 2000] was carried out similarly to the
lower bound for ML1W by carrying out a well-ordering proof. That proof is rather
technical, and to go into details is beyond the scope of this article.
7. APPLICATION: INDUCTIVE-RECURSIVE DEFINITIONS
Induction-recursion. The concept of induction-recursion is due to Dybjer
[Dybjer, 2000]. It is an abstract formalisation of the general principles used for
introducing new sets in Martin-Lo¨f type theory (excluding the Mahlo principle).
The principle of strictly positive inductive definitions in simple type theory has
been studied since long time ago. An algebraic data type A (introduced by construc-
tors Ci) is defined strictly positive inductively, if the constructors are of the form
Ci : B1 → · · · → Bn → A, where Bi either do not depend on A, or are of the form
D1 → · · · → Dk → A, where Di do not depend on A. Both n and k can be 0. An
argument of a constructor of type Bi not referring to A is called a non-inductive ar-
gument, an argument of type D1 → · · · → Dk → A is called an inductive argument.
Examples are the finite sets Nl with constructors A
i
l : Nl for i = 0, . . . , l − 1 (the
constructors have no arguments); the set of natural numbers N with constructors
0 : N and S : N → N (the constructor S has one inductive argument where k as
above is 0); the set Nlist of lists of natural numbers with constructors nil : Nlist
(no arguments) and cons : N→ Nlist→ Nlist (one non-inductive and one inductive
argument).
In dependent type theory, the argument types Bi can depend on previous non-
inductive arguments. So here we have Ci : (x1 : B1) → (x2 : B2) → · · · → (xn :
Bn) → A where Bi are either independent of A or of the form (y1 : D1) → · · · →
(yk : Dk) → A. Examples are the set Σx : A.B(x) with constructor p : (x : A) →
B → Σx : A.B(x) (two non-inductive arguments, the second depends on the first);
the set Πx : A.B(x) with constructor λ : ((x : A) → B(x)) → (Πx : A.B(x))
(no inductive argument); the set Wx : A.B(x) with constructor sup : (x : A) →
(B(x) → (Wx : A.B(x))) → (Wx : A.B(x)) (the first argument is non-inductive,
the second is inductive and depends on the first).
The above can be generalised to indexed inductive definitions, where we define
several sets Ai simultaneously inductively. This can take the form of finitely many
sets, each of which has different constructors. An example for this is the set of finitely
branching trees FinTree together with the set of lists of such trees FinTreeList (the
example is due to U. Berger): lists of finite trees are introduced in a standard way by
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having constructors nil : FinTreeList, cons : FinTree→ FinTreeList→ FinTreeList.
Furthermore, if we have a list of trees, we can form a tree, having the elements of the
list as subtrees, so we have a constructor maketree : FinTreeList→ FinTree. A more
general form of indexed inductive definition is, when we introduce simultaneously
possibly infinitely many sets A(i) (i : I) indexed over a set I. One degenerate
example for this is the equality set I(A, a, b), which can be considered as a set
C(〈a, b〉) indexed over 〈a, b〉 : A×A. It has constructor refl : (a : A)→ C(〈a, a〉). An
example, which is really inductive, is the predicate Even(n) for n : N, meaning “n is
even”. It has constructors zeroproof : Even(0) and succproof : (n : N,Even(n)) →
Even(S(S(n))). The general form of indexed inductive definition is that we have
constructors of type (x1 : B1)→ · · · → (xn : Bn)→ A(j), and where Bl either does
not depend on A(i), or is of the form (y1 : D1) → · · · → (yk : Dk) → A(j
′), where
j′ might depend on y1, . . . , yk. j might depend on the noninductive arguments xi of
type Bi, where Bi does not depend on A(i).
In inductive definitions, the argument types cannot depend on previous inductive
arguments: Before introducing a new set (or sets) inductively, we have to introduce
the argument types of the constructors, which cannot refer to the set(s) to be in-
troduced. Inductive-recursive definitions go beyond inductive definition, and will
allow an indirect dependency of argument types on previous inductive arguments.
An example of a truly inductive-recursive definition is a standard universe. The
constructor introducing the code for the Σ-set as an element of the universe has
the form Σ̂ : (a : U) → (b : T(a) → U) → U. When looking at a process for
constructing the elements of such a universe, we see that, whenever one constructs
an element a : U, one has to define immediately T(a). Otherwise one cannot use
this element for forming further elements of U. This means that we define elements
of U inductively, while defining simultaneously recursively T(a) for every element
a : U introduced – therefore the terminology inductive-recursive definition. In the
above example for instance, one defines T(Σ̂(a, b)) = Σx : T(a).T(b x).
In inductive-recursive definitions, later arguments can depend on arbitrary pre-
vious non-inductive arguments and on the recursively defined function applied to
previous inductive arguments. The result of T can depend in the same way on the
arguments, as can later arguments depend on previous ones.
A closed formalisation of inductive-recursive definitions. In P. Dybjer’s
original formalisation, the dependency of arguments on previous arguments was
syntactic, and meant essentially the occurrence of a variable for one argument in
the term for a later argument. Therefore, his type theory is a schema, which allows
to introduce for each inductive-recursively defined set new rules. However, we can
see that, before we can introduce a new inductive-recursive definition, we often need
first to carry out a proof using the rules defined before.
We give an example: Assume we want to define inductive-recursively a non-
standard universe U,T (i.e. a universe which is not closed under standard type
theoretic constructions). Instead it should contain a code for N and, if a0, a1, a2 : U,
and T(ai) = Ai, then U should contain a code for A0 + (A1 + A2). For this to be a
good definition, we need to know, before adding the rules for such a universe to type
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theory, that we have that A+ (B +C) : Type, provided A,B,C : Type. In this toy
example, this is of course obvious, but one can easily construct more complicated
examples, which require a long derivation. So in general, before introducing an
inductive-recursive definition, one has to derive certain type theoretic judgements.
Therefore we see that in P. Dybjer’s original framework one has to work as follows:
one starts with basic inductive-recursive definitions. Then one derives type theoretic
formulae, using which one can introduce additional inductive-recursive definitions.
Then one can introduce further inductive-recursive definitions, and so on.
It is difficult to analyse a framework like this proof theoretically and to con-
struct models of it. Therefore P. Dybjer and myself developed in a series of articles
[Dybjer and Setzer, 1999, 2001, 2003(b), 2003(a)] a closed formalisation of inductive-
recursive definitions. “Closed” means that we have a fixed set of rules, which we can
introduce from the beginning, which don’t depend on previous proofs, and which
allow to introduce all inductive-recursive definitions. The formalisation taken makes
use of ideas used in the definition of the Mahlo universe. In fact, the resulting theory
reaches the strength of a slightly weakened version of Mahlo type theory.
We will in the following only consider the non-indexed case. We will make use
of the logical framework. We used as logical framework operations the dependent
function-type with η-rule (written as (x : A) → B – we reserve the notation Πx :
A.B(x) for the definition of a set having essentially the same rules, but no η-rule)
the dependent product with η-rule (written as (x : A)× B – again, Σx : A.B(x) is
reserved for a corresponding set, which has no η-rule), and the types having zero,
one and two elements, written as 0, 1, 2. The canonical element of 1 is ∗ and the
canonical elements of 2 are ∗0 and ∗1. We add the η-rule for 1, which expresses that
for x : 1, x = ∗ : 1 We have as well case distinction case2 : 2 → A → A → A for
any type A, with the equalities case2(∗0, a, b) = a, case2(∗1, a, b) = b. Furthermore,
we have Set : Type, containing inductive-recursively defined sets. All sets are types.
Both Set and Type are closed under the operations of the logical framework.3
In the following, we will uncurry the arguments of the constructors, so we have
Ci : ((x1 : B1) × · · · × (xn : Bn)) → A instead of Ci : (x1 : B1) → · · · → (xn :
Bn) → A. We can code several constructors into one by having one additional
argument, which is an element of a finite set and indicates, which constructor was
chosen. Depending on this argument, the types for the other arguments of the
constructors are taken. Therefore, our inductive-recursively defined sets will have
only one constructor.
Rules for inductive-recursive definitions. In the new type theory, we will
replace the notion of dependency of a type B on x : A, as it occurred in P. Dybjer’s
original schema by a judgement Γ, x : A,∆ ⇒ B : Type. In order to able to
derive that something is an inductive recursive definition, we need a corresponding
judgement, and therefore we will introduce a type OPD of codes for inductive-
3In our original articles besides Set an additional type stype was used. Set contained only sets
introduced inductive-recursively, whereas stype contained all elements of Set, but not Set itself, and
was closed under the operation of the logical framework. This distinction is not really necessary,
and we omit it in this article.
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recursive definitions, depending on a type D (the meaning of D will be explained
later on). To derive an inductive recursive definition means to derive an element
γ : OPD. For every inductive recursive definition γ : OPD we introduce the inductive
recursively defined set Uγ introduced by it together with its decoding function Tγ,
having typing rule a : Uγ ⇒ Tγ(a) : D. This explains now the meaning of the
parameter D in OPD: D is the codomain of the recursively defined functions Tγ
for γ : OPD. For instance, if we take D = Set, then (Uγ,Tγ) will be a universe,
but not necessarily closed under type theoretic operations. If we take D = 1, then
we have Tγ(a) = ∗, so Tγ doesn’t carry any information – this is nothing but an
ordinary inductive definition (as opposed to an inductive-recursive definition). If
we take D = ((X : Set) × (X → Set)) → ((X : Set) × (X → Set)), Uγ will be a
universe of operations, where an operation maps families of sets to families of sets.
In general D can be any type. In the following, D will be kept fixed, and we assume
globally D : Type. When fully spelled out, all rules will have an additional premise
D : Type.
Note that OPD is therefore some kind of big universe, having two decoding
functions, namely λγ.Uγ : OPD → Set and λγ.λx.Tγ(x) : (γ : OPD)→ (Uγ → Set).
OPD itself cannot be defined inductive-recursively.
The argument type of the constructor is given by FUγ , having the formation rule
γ : OPD U : Set T : U → Set
FUγ (U, T ) : Set
The result of Tγ applied to a constructor element, is given by F
T
γ , having the for-
mation rule
γ : OPD U : Set T : U → Set a : F
U
γ (U, T )
FTγ (U, T, a) : D
So when introducing γ : OPD we have to define F
U
γ and F
T
γ .
Once this is defined we have the following formation and equality rules for
inductive-recursively defined sets:
Uγ : Set Tγ : Uγ → D
The introduction rules for Uγ and equality rules for Tγ are
introγ : F
U
γ (Uγ,Tγ)→ Uγ Tγ(introγ(a)) = F
T
γ (Uγ,Tγ, a)
We have the following rules for generating elements of OPD:
• Addition of a non-inductive argument: Assume A : Set and γ : A →
OPD. Then we can form a new code σ(A, γ) : OPD for the inductive-recursive
definition, having a first non-inductive argument a : A, and depending on it,
the other arguments taken from γ(a). So we have
FUσ(A,γ)(U, T ) = (a : A)× F
U
γ(a)(U, T )
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The result of Tγ for an element introγ(a) is the result obtained for the remain-
ing arguments with respect to γ(a). Therefore we have:
FTσ(A,γ)(U, T, 〈a, b〉) = F
T
γ(a)(U, T, b)
• Addition of an inductive argument: Assume A : Set and γ : (A →
D)→ OPD. Then we can form a new code δ(A, γ) for the inductive-recursive
definition, having a first inductive argument indexed over A, i.e. f : A→ Uγ.
The further arguments depend on Tγ applied to the elements of Uγ, to which
f is referring, i.e. on Tγ ◦ f , and are therefore taken from γ(Tγ ◦ f). So we
have
FUδ(A,γ)(U, T ) = (f : A→ U)× F
U
γ(T◦f)(U, T )
The result of Tγ for an element introγ(a) is the result obtained for the remain-
ing arguments with respect to γ(Tγ ◦ f). Therefore we have:
FTδ(A,γ)(U, T, 〈f, b〉) = F
T
γ(T◦f)(U, T, b)
• Base case: This corresponds to the inductive-recursive definition with no
arguments. We only have to determine the result of T, which is an element of
type D. Assuming ψ : D, we have therefore ι(ψ) : OPD and the rules
FUι(ψ)(U, T ) = 1 ,
FTι(ψ)(U, T, ∗) = ψ .
Elimination and equality rules. In order to define the elimination and equality
rules, one has to define first for every γ : OPD two more types:
γ : OPD U : Set T : U → D
u : FUγ (U, T ) x : U ⇒ E[x] : Type
F IHγ (U, T,E, u) : Type
γ : OPD U : Set T : U → Set
x : U ⇒ E[x] : Type h : (x : U)→ E[x]
Fmapγ (U, T,E, h) : (u : F
U
γ (U, T ))→ F
IH
γ (U, T,E, u)
Then the elimination rule for Uγ is as follows:
x : Uγ ⇒ E[x] : Type
g : (u : FUγ (Uγ,Tγ),F
IH
γ (Uγ,Tγ, E, u))→ E[introγ(u)]
Rγ,E(g) : (u : Uγ)→ E[u]
The equality rule is as follows:
x : Uγ ⇒ E[x] : Type
g : (u : FUγ (Uγ,Tγ),F
IH
γ (Uγ,Tγ, E, u))→ E[introγ(u)]
u : FUγ (Uγ,Tγ)
Rγ,E(g, introγ(u)) = g(u,F
map
γ (Uγ,Tγ, E,Rγ,E(g), u)) : E[introγ(u)]
We won’t give the equality rules for FIHγ and F
map
γ here, the straighforward and
boring details can be found in [Dybjer and Setzer, 2003b].
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Examples. The first examples will be inductive definitions, so in this case D := 1.
Let ι∗ := ι(∗) : OP1. The finite sets are defined by
γN0 := σ(0, λx.ι∗) : OP1 .
γN1 := ι∗ : OP1 ,
γNn+2 := σ(2, λx.case2(x, γNn+1 , ι∗)) : OP1 .
A+B and Σx : A.B(x) have codes
γA+B := σ(2, λx.case2(x, σ(A, λy.ι∗), σ(B, λy.ι∗))) ,
γΣx:A.B(x) := σ(A, λx.σ(B(x), λy.ι∗)) .
N has code
γN := σ(2, λx.case2(x, ι∗, δ(1, λy.ι∗))) .
Zero is here introγN(〈∗0, ∗〉), and the successor of n is introγN(〈∗1, 〈n, ∗〉〉).
Wx : A.B(x) has code
γWx:A.B(x) := σ(A, λx.δ(B(x), λy.ι∗)) .
Finally, the first universe (consisting of U0 : Set and T0 : U0 → Set and for simplicity
closed under N and Σ only) has code
γU0,T0 := σ(2, λx.case2(x, ι(N), δ(1, λA.δ(A(∗), λB.ι(Σx : A(∗), B x))) : OPSet .
Application in generic programming. The theory developed has a data type
for inductive-recursive definitions. If one considers this type theory as a functional
programming language, it is possible to write programs, which have a higher degree
of polymorphism, and take as input a data type (an element of OPD), analyse it
and generate a new data type (a new element of OPD). Such kind of program-
ming is called generic programming. Examples for its use are: a function, which
takes an inductive recursive definition and adds one constructor to it, together with
an embedding of the original one into the new one; and the definition of a de-
fined equality relation on a data type. This is an area of ongoing research; see
[Dybjer and Setzer, 1998, Benke et al., 2003, 3] for details.
Inductive-recursive definitions and the Mahlo universe. The constructor δ
of OPD has type δ : (A : Set, γ : (A → D) → OPD) → OPD and refers therefore
negatively to D. Note that D can be Set, and that from elements of OPD we
introduce new elements of Set. Therefore elements of Set can be introduced by
referring negatively to Set.
In fact, Set is essentially a weak variant of the Mahlo universe (the strength of
a type theory with a weak Mahlo universe is only slightly below that of the type
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theory with a full Mahlo universe): Assume f0 : (A : Set, B : A → Set) → Set and
f1 : (A : Set, B : A→ Set, f0(A,B))→ Set. Let
γ0(~f) := δ(1, λA
′.δ(A′(∗), λB′.ι(f0(A
′(∗), B′)))) : OPSet
γ1(~f) := δ(1, λA
′.δ(A′(∗), λB′.σ(f0(A
′(∗), B′), λC.ι(f1(A
′(∗), B′, C))))) : OPSet
γ(~f) := σ(2, λx.case2(x, γ0(~f), γ1(~f))
Then Uγ(~f) will be, similar to U~f in case of the Mahlo universe, a universe closed
under f0, f1. Here introγ(~f)(〈∗0, · · ·〉) and introγ(~f)(〈∗1, · · ·〉) will play the roˆle of
Res0, Res1, respectively, in the Mahlo universe. In this form, the universe Uγ(~f) will
be empty, but one can easily expand γ(~f) and guarantee that Uγ(~f) is closed under
the standard universe constructions as well. Therefore, for every pair of functions
~f from families of elements of Set into families of elements of Set there exists a
universe in Set closed under ~f . Note that, in the presence of the logical framework,
it is possible to have ~f as elements of the context.
In appendix D we will show, using this observation, that the theory of inductive-
recursive definitions reaches the strength of KPM, Kripke-Platek set theory with
Mahloness of the universe.
Model. In [Dybjer and Setzer, 1999], a model of the theory of inductive-
recursive definitions was developed in set theory plus the existence of one strongly
Mahlo cardinal. There we interpreted Set as VM, where (Vα)α∈Ord is the com-
mulative hierarchy of sets and M is one strongly Mahlo cardinal. The usual set
constructions were interpreted by their na¨ıve interpretation, e.g. [[A → B ]] was
interpreted as the set theoretic function space [[A ]] → [[B ]]. OPD was interpreted
as an appropriate inductive definition. We defined approximations of Uαγ , T
α
γ of the
interpretation of Uγ, Tγ, and interpreted Uγ as U
M
γ , Tγ as T
M
γ . The definition of
Uαγ was based on the interpretation of λU, T.〈F
U
γ (U, T ),F
T
γ (U, T )〉. For every α < M
there exists a β < M s.t. if U ∈ Vα, T ∈ U → [[D ]], then [[F
U
γ (U, T ) ]]U 7→U,T 7→T ∈ Vβ.
By the Mahlo property one obtained a κ < M recursively inaccessible, s.t. if α < κ,
then the β as above is < κ. Using the recursive inaccessibility of κ it followed then
that Uκγ = U
M
γ and therefore [[ Uγ ]] ∈ [[ Set ]].
Upper Bound. We introduced the above mentioned model, because it is rather
natural. Using this model one obtains an upper bound, which is far too big, namely
that of ZF plus the existence of one strongly Mahlo cardinal. We have not yet
spelled out a model, which uses only the strength of KPM+. In order to define
such a model, one would have to interpret Set as the iteration of an operator up to
the first recursively Mahlo ordinal M in a similar way as the interpretation of the
Mahlo universe. The interpretation of OPD would require in such a model finitely
many admissibles above the recursively Mahlo ordinal. We do not expect any major
difficulties in carrying this out in detail.
Precise strength. Assuming the model in KPM+ has been developed, we obtain
an interval for the strength of the theory, namely [|KPM|, |KPM+|]. We do not know
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yet currently, what the exact strength is. This depends on, whether the types OPD
actually contribute to the strength of the theory of inductive-recursive definitions.
APPENDIX A: DIRECT WELL-FOUNDEDNESS PROOF OF THE ORDINAL
NOTATION SYSTEM OF STRENGTH ǫ0
We sketch here a direct well-ordering proof for the ordinal notation system of
strength ǫ0, developed in Sect. 2.. This argument doesn’t refer to ordinals, and
can be formalised, restricted to ordinals < ǫ0, in Peano Arithmetic.
The argument proceeds as follows: First one shows that, if (A,<A), (B,<B) are
well-founded linear orderings, so are (A × B,<A×B) and (Adec, <lex). Here <A×B
is the lexicographic ordering on pairs 〈a, b〉, where a ∈ A and b ∈ B, Adec is the
set of w.r.t. < descending sequences of A (i.e. the set of sequences 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉
s.t. a0 > · · · > an−1), and <lex is the lexicographic ordering on these sequences
(we suppress the dependencies of Adec on <). Define for orderings (X,<) on N the
operation Γ(X,<) := ((X×N)dec, (<X×N)lex) as defined before. Then (OTǫ0 , <ǫ0) =
(
⋃
n∈ω An,
⋃
n∈ω <n) with (An, <n) := Γ
n((∅, ∅)). Observe that (An, <n) is the set of
ordinal notations < ωω
·
·
·
1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. (∅, ∅) is trivially well-founded, therefore each (An, <n) are
well-founded. Furthermore, one can easily see that (An, <n) ⊑ (An+1, <n+1) where
⊑ means “initial segment” defined as (A,<) ⊑ (B,<′) :⇔ A ⊆ B∧ <′↾ A × A =<
∧∀a ∈ A.∀b ∈ B.b <′ a → b ∈ A. It is easy to see that if (Bn, <n) are well-
founded and transitive, (Bn, <n) ⊑ (Bn+1, <n+1) for all n, then (
⋃
n∈ω Bn,
⋃
n∈ω <n)
is well-founded. Therefore it follows that (OTǫ0 , <ǫ0) is well-founded.
From the above argument one can develop in Peano Arithmetic a proof of the
principle of transfinite induction for formulae of PA over (An, <n) for Meta-each n,
and therefore for OTǫ0 restricted to any ordinal b < ǫ0.
APPENDIX B: DETERMINATION OF THE STRENGTH OF TYPE THEORY
WITH ONE UNIVERSE AND THE W-TYPE
Upper bound for the proof theoretic strength of ML1W. We will in the
following construct a model of ML1W with extensional equality in a theory of the
same strength, namely KPI+, and use therefore KPI+ as Meta-theory.
We form a simple PER (= partial equivalence relation) model: every type expres-
sion A in dependent type theory is modelled as a set [[A ]]ρ of pairs of terms, namely
those terms which are considered to be equal, and, if ML1W proves A : Type, then
[[A ]]ρ will be a partial equivalence relation, i.e. transitive and symmetric. In the
model, we identify terms with their Go¨del-numbers. ρ is an environment, i.e. a finite
map from variables to closed terms, s.t. all free variables of A are in the domain of ρ.
Let for sets of pairs of terms A, B A→ B := {〈s, s′〉 | ∀〈r, r′〉 ∈ A.〈s(r), s′(r′)〉 ∈ B}.
We form the model for the restriction of type theory, where the W-rank of type ex-
pressions is ≤ n for some n ∈ N. Here the W-rank of A is 0, if A does not contain
U. Otherwise, the rank of U is 1, the rank of Wx : A.B(x) is the maximum of the
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W-rank of A, B(x) incremented by 1, and the rank of all other type expression is
the maximum of the W-rank of its immediate subterms which are subtypes (e.g. the
W-rank of Πx : A.B(x) is the maximum of the W-rank of A and B(x)).
We introduce some notations: x1 7→ r1, . . . , xn 7→ rn denotes the environment,
mapping xi to ri. If ρ is an environment, ρ(x 7→ r) is the environment, mapping x to
ρ and y 6= x to ρ(y), provided y is in the domain of ρ. We write [x1 := r1, . . . , xn :=
rn] for the simultaneous substitution of xi by ri. If Γ = x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, we
write ∀〈~r, ~r′〉 ∈ [[ Γ ]] for
∀〈r1, r
′
1〉 ∈ [[A1 ]],∀〈r2, r
′
2〉 ∈ [[A2 ]]x1 7→r1 , . . . ,∀〈rn, r
′
n〉 ∈ [[An ]]x1 7→r1,...,xn−1 7→rn−1 .
Furthermore, we write ~x 7→ ~r for the environment x1 7→ r1, . . . , xn 7→ rn and [~x := ~r]
for [x1 := r1, . . . , xn := rn], assuming that the choice of xi, ri is obvious from the
context.
We first state what it means for a derived judgement to be correct in this model.
We define the set of immediate presuppositions (ips) of a judgement as follows:
• ∅ ⇒ Context has no ips.
• The ips of Γ, x : A⇒ Context is Γ⇒ A : Type.
• The ips of Γ⇒ A : Type is Γ⇒ Context.
• The ips of Γ⇒ A = B are Γ⇒ A : Type and Γ⇒ B : Type.
• The ips of Γ⇒ s : A is Γ⇒ A : Type.
• The ips of Γ⇒ r = s : A are Γ⇒ r : A and Γ⇒ s : A.
Then one defines the presuppositions of a judgement as follows:
• The ips of a judgement are presuppositions of it.
• The ips of a presupposition of a judgement are as well presuppositions of that
judgement.
The correctness condition for Γ⇒ θ is defined as the conjunction of the immediate
correctness conditions (icc) of all its presuppositions and of the judgement itself,
where the icc of a judgement Γ⇒ θ is defined as follows:
• If θ = Context, then the icc is the true formula.
• If θ is A = B : Type, then the icc is
∀〈~r, ~r′〉 ∈ [[ Γ ]].[[A ]]~x 7→~r = [[B ]]~x 7→~r′ ∧ Equiv([[A ]]~x 7→~r),
where Equiv(X) means that A is a partial equivalence relation on terms.
• If θ = A : Type, then the icc is the same as that of Γ⇒ A = A : Type.
• If θ is r = s : A, the icc is
∀〈~r, ~r′〉 ∈ [[ Γ ]].〈r[~x := ~r], s[~x := ~r′]〉 ∈ [[A ]]~x 7→~r.
• If θ is r : A, the icc is the same as that of Γ⇒ r = r : A.
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Standard types are modelled in a straightforward way, e.g.
[[ Πx : A.B ]]ρ := {〈r, r
′〉 |∀〈s, s′〉 ∈ [[A ]]ρ([[B ]]ρ[x 7→s] = [[B ]]ρ[x 7→s′]
∧〈r(s), r′(s′)〉 ∈ [[B ]]ρ[x 7→s])}
Interpretation of the W-type. The W-type corresponds in Kripke-Platek set
theory to the step to the next admissible. In order to interpret this type, we
will introduce for every type A, when defining [[A ]]ρ, additionally an α ∈ Ord
s.t. [[A ]]ρ ∈ Lα for any environment ρ. This will be done in such a way that
α < κn(= ℵ
rec
Iδ+n
), if the W-rank of A is n. The definition of α is straightforward,
except in case of Wx : A.B(x):
Assume [[A ]]ρ′ and [[B ]]ρ′ have already been defined for environments ρ
′. Then
we define [[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ as follows: First, we define for environments ρ an operator
Γρ on sets of pairs of terms by
Γρ(X) := Cl({〈sup(r, s), sup(r
′, s′)〉 |
〈r, r′〉 ∈ [[A ]]ρ ∧ [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r) = [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r′) ∧ 〈s, s
′〉 ∈ [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r) → X})
Here Cl(X) is the closure of X under reductions, i.e.
Cl(X) := {〈r, r′〉 | ∃〈s, s′〉 ∈ X.(r −→ s ∧ r′ −→ s′)}
If α is s.t. for all ρ [[A ]]ρ, [[B ]]ρ ∈ Lα and α
+ is the least admissible above α, we
can define the least fixed point of Γρ as the iteration Γ
α+
ρ of Γρ α
+-times (starting
with the empty set and taking at limit points the union), and therefore define
[[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ := Γ
α+
ρ .
It is easy to see that if 〈r, r′〉 ∈ [[A ]]ρ, and 〈s, s
′〉 ∈ [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r) → [[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ,
then 〈sup(r, s), sup(r′, s′)〉 ∈ [[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ: We have [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r) ∈ Lα+ , and for
all t, t′ s.t. 〈t, t′〉 ∈ [[B ]]ρ(x 7→r) it follows 〈s(t), s
′(t′)〉 ∈ Γα
+
ρ , therefore there exists by
the admissibility of κ a γ < α+ s.t. for all such t, t′ we have 〈s(t), s′(t′)〉 ∈ Γγρ , and
therefore 〈sup(r, s), sup(r′, s′)〉 ∈ Γγ+1ρ ⊆ Γ
α+
ρ .
It is easy to show that [[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ is a partial equivalence relation. In
order to show that the correctness condition w.r.t. the induction rule is fulfilled,
one shows first, assuming the correctness of the premises of the induction rule, by
induction over γ the correctness of the conclusion for elements of Γγρ instead of
[[Wx : A.B(x) ]]ρ. Then the correctness of the conclusion without this replacement
follows.
Interpretation of the universe. In order to interpret the universe, we define
simultaneously a set of pairs of terms Uα, and for r, r′ s.t. 〈r, r′〉 ∈ Uα a set of pairs
of terms Tα(r), s.t. Uα and Tα(r) are partial equivalence relations, Uα ⊆ Uβ and
Tβ(r) = Tα(r) for α < β and r s.t. 〈r, r〉 ∈ Uα, and s.t. Uα and Tα(r) are in
Lℵrecα+2 . Then we interpret [[ U ]]ρ := U
I and [[ T(r) ]]ρ := T
I(rρ) (which is empty for
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〈rρ, rρ〉 6∈ U
I), where I is the first recursively inaccessible ordinal, and rρ is the result
of substituting in r free variables according to ρ.
The inductive definition is straightforward. E.g. if 〈r, r′〉 ∈ U<α (where U<α =⋃
β<αU
β) and for 〈t, t′〉 ∈ T<α(r), 〈s[x := t], s′[x′ := t′]〉 ∈ U<α, then 〈Ŵx :
r.s, Ŵx′ : r′.s′〉 ∈ Uα and Tα(Ŵx : r.s) = [[Wx : T(r).T(s) ]]′, where [[Wx :
T(r).T(s) ]]′ is defined as above, but interpreting [[ T(r) ]] as T<α(r), similarly for
[[ T(s) ]]x 7→t. Furthermore, U is closed under reductions.
We have to show Uα,Tα(r) ∈ ℵrecα+2. The crucial part of the proof is when we add
Ŵx : a.b to Uα. By IH T<α(r) and T<α(s[x := t]) are in Lβ for β := supα′<α ℵ
rec
α′+2.
We have β ≤ κ := ℵrecα+1 < ℵ
rec
α+2 and κ is admissible. By the admissibility of
κ and Lκ =
⋃
γ<κ Lγ, there exists a γ < κ s.t. T
<α(r) ∈ Lγ, and for 〈t, t〉 ∈
T<α(r), T<α(s[x := t]) ∈ Lγ. Therefore the fixed point of the operator defining
[[Wx : T(r).T(s) ]] can be obtained by iterating the operator up to κ, and therefore
[[Wx : T(r).T(s) ]] ∈ Lℵrecα+2 .
We show now that U<I is closed under the introduction rules for the universe.
In case of the W-type, this is done as follows: Assume 〈r, r′〉 ∈ U<I and for 〈t, t′〉 ∈
T<I(r), 〈s[x := t], s′[x′ := t′]〉 ∈ U<I. Then T<I(r) ∈ LI, and therefore there exists an
α < I s.t. for all t, t′ as above 〈s[x := t], s′[x′ := t′]〉 ∈ Uα. Here we used that I is an
admissible closed under λα.ℵrecα . Now it follows that 〈Ŵx : r.s, Ŵx
′ : r′.s′〉 ∈ Uα+1.
Completion of the proof of the upper bound. Now one shows that every
arithmetic statement provable in ML1W can be shown in KPI
+. Let ψ be any arith-
metic formula. We extend the set of terms by additional terms Cϕ,~x for all subformu-
lae ϕ of ψ and variables ~x = x1, . . . , xk containing the free variables of ϕ, together
with reduction rules for Cϕ,~x. This will be done in such a way that in the model
we have provable in KPI+ ∀n1, . . . , nk ∈ ω.〈Cϕ,~x(n1, . . . , nk), Cϕ,~x(n1, . . . , nk)〉 ∈
[[ϕ ]]~x 7→~n ⇔ [[ϕ ]]~x 7→~n 6= ∅ ⇔ ϕ[x1 := n1, . . . , xk := nk]. Especially, if ML1W proves
ϕ, then for all ~n [[ϕ ]]~x 7→~n is inhabited and therefore ϕ[~x := ~n] holds in KPI
+. If
ϕ ≡ r = s then Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ refl, if r[~x := ~n] = s[~x := ~n] is true, otherwise the
term does not reduce. Here refl is the canonical element of the identity type r =N s
between r and s. If ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ 〈Cϕ0,~x(~n),Cϕ1,~x(~n)〉, if ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
then Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ inl(Cϕ0,~x(~n)) if ϕ0[~x := ~n] holds, and Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ inr(Cϕ1,~x(~n))
otherwise. If ϕ ≡ ϕ0 → ϕ1 then Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ λx.Cϕ1,~x(~n). if ϕ ≡ ∀x.ψ, Cϕ,~x(~n) −→
λy.Cψ,~x,x(~n, y), and if ϕ ≡ ∃x.ψ, then Cϕ,~x(~n) −→ 〈n,Cψ,~x,x(~n, n)〉, if n is minimal
s.t. ψ[~x := ~n, x := n] holds; if there is no such n, there is no reduction for Cϕ,~x(~n).
It follows that, if an arithmetic sentence ψ is provable in ML1W, then by forming
the above model w.r.t. ψ it follows that ψ holds in KPI+. Therefore the limit of
transfinite induction provable for all arithmetic formulae in ML1W is less than or
equal that for KPI+, therefore |ML1W| ≤ |KPI
+|.
Ordinal notation system. Whereas for the upper bound one is relying on the
proof theoretic analysis of KPI+, the lower bound will be carried out explicitly, and
we need first to set up an ordinal notation system of appropriate strength.
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The ordinal notation system will have as basic constants 0 and I, where I is the
first strongly inaccessible cardinal.4 One takes as basic functions addition of ordinals,
the Veblen function ϕ (where ϕ0β = ωβ and for α > 0 ϕαβ is the βth common fixed
point of λβ′.ϕα′β′ for α′ < α) and λα.Ωα (where Ω0 = 0 and Ωα = ℵ
rec
α otherwise).
Furthermore, one adds the collapsing function ψ. Here one defines simultaneously
for κ ∈ R (where R is the set of regular cardinals) by recursion on α
ψκα := min{β | κ ∈ C(α, β) ∧ C(α, β) ∩ κ ⊆ β} ,
C(α, β) := Closure of β under 0, I,+, ϕ, λα.Ωα, λπ ∈ R.λξ < α.ψπξ .
It is outside the scope of this article to give a detailed explanation of the ψ-function,
here we give only a few remarks. If κ = Ωβ+1, then ψκα is the least ordinal ≥ Ωα,
s.t., if we form the closure under basic constants, basic functions and all collapsing
functions we have defined before, i.e. with arguments < α, we do not get any new
ordinals < κ. In case of κ = I, I is automatically contained in the closure and we
need only that the same closure as before does not contain any new ordinals < I.
Let Γα the αth fixed point of λα.ϕα0, i.e. the αth ordinal, which cannot be defined
from smaller ones using 0, + and the Veblen function. Let β be the first fixed point
of λα.Γα. For α < β, ψΩ1α = Γα, and β = ψΩ1(Ω1). Let Iα be the αth (not necessary
regular) fixed point of λα.Ωα and γ be the first (non-regular) fixed point of λα.Iα.
For α < γ, ψI(α) = Iα and ψI(I) = γ.
If one adapts the analysis of KPI in [Buchholz, 1992] to an analysis of KPI+, one
can see that |KPI+| = ψΩ1(ΩI+ω).
Lower bound for the strength of ML1W. The lower bound is obtained by
proving directly in ML1W transfinite induction up to ψΩ1(ΩI+n) for (Meta-)every
n < ω. Then it follows |ML1W| ≥ supn∈ω ψΩ1(ΩI+n) = ψΩ1ΩI+ω = |KPI
+|. We will
use the technique of distinguished sets, which is due to Buchholz. Before introducing
it, we start with some basic definitions.
An expression C[x] is a type expression possibly depending on a free variable
x, and we write C[t] for C[x := t] (possibly applying some α-conversion to C first
in order to avoid clashes of bound and free variables). A subset B of a set A is a
function B : A→ U, and a subclass is an expression B[x] s.t. x : A⇒ B[x] : Type.
In case of subsets we write x ∈ B for T(B(x)) and in case of subclasses x ∈ B
for B[x]. ∀x ∈ B.C[x] := ∀x : A.x ∈ B → C[x], similarly for ∃x ∈ B.C[x].
The following definitions can be carried out both for sets and for classes, although
we we will explicitly only define them for sets. If B,C are subsets of A, then
B ⊆ C :⇔ ∀x ∈ B.x ∈ C, B ∼= C :⇔ B ⊆ C ∧ C ⊆ B. A partially ordered
set (class) (A,<) is a type A together with a binary relation < on A, i.e. a type
expression x < y s.t. x : A, y : A⇒ x < y : Type. For partially ordered sets A and
4One could replace all cardinals in the following by their recursive analogues (admissibles),
but setting up an ordinal notation system like this is much more complicated. What eventually
matters is only the resulting ordinal notation system, which is primitive recursive and w.r.t. which
we prove upper and lower bounds for the proof theoretic strength of corresponding theories. The set
theoretic development can be considered as mere heuristic. It is however a very valuable heuristic,
since it has contributed to a much better understanding of the ordinal notation systems developed.
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a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b :⇔ a = b ∨ a < b. For a ∈ A, B,C ⊆ A, a ≤ B :⇔ ∃b ∈ B.a ≤ b,
C ≤ B :⇔ ∀c ∈ C.c ≤ B. For partially ordered sets (A,<) we identify a ∈ A with
{b ∈ A | b < a} and write a + 1 for {b ∈ A | b ≤ a}; this explains for instance
notions like A ∩ (a + 1). If B,C ⊆ A, B ⊑ C (“B is an initial segment of C”) iff
∀b ∈ B.B ∩ (b + 1) ∼= C ∩ (b + 1). If (A,<) is a partially ordered set (i.e. < is a
binary relation on a set A), we can form the accessible part Acc(A) as the largest
well-founded segment of A.
Let (OT, <) be the ordinal notation system constructed from the above men-
tioned functions. We define for A ⊆ OT the set Ca(A) as the closure of A∩ a under
0, I, +, ϕ, λγ.Ωγ and λκ > a.λγ.ψκγ. Let M(A) := {α | α ∈ C
α(A)}. So the
elements of M(A) are those, which can be formed from A ∩ α from basic functions
and collapsing functions ψκ with κ > α.
Distinguished sets. In order to get an idea of what a distinguished set is, we will
give first some examples of distinguished sets, as they were introduced originally.
Later we will slightly change this definition.
The first one A0 is the accessible part of the ordinals below Ω1. The next one,
A1 is the union of A0 with the accessible part of the ordinals α ∈ [Ω1,Ω2[ s.t. their
components below Ω1 are in A0, i.e. s.t. α ∈ C
Ω1(A0). The next one, A2 is the union
of A1 with the accessible part of the ordinals α ∈ [Ω2,Ω3[ having components below
Ω2 in A1, i.e. s.t. α ∈ C
Ω2(A1). This series can be iterated transfinitely in an obvious
way. Sets A introduced in this way can be characterised as having the following
property: for all α s.t. Ωα ≤ A we have that A∩ [Ωα,Ωα+1[ is the accessible part of
CΩα(A) ∩ [Ωα,Ωα+1[. This was essentially the original definition of a distinguished
set. In order to avoid the jumps at Ωα, we introduce the following variations of this
definition: first one replaces β ∈ CΩα(A) by β ∈ Cβ(A), i.e. β ∈ M(A) – this has only
a minor effect on the definition. Furthermore, one consideres the definition of the
accessible part: This is an inductive definition of the form: “if β ∈ M(A)∩[Ωα,Ωα+1[
and β ∩M(A) ∩ [Ωα, β[ is a subset of the accessible part, then β is in the accessible
part”. This definition, in which one examines A in slices of the form [Ωα,Ωα+1[ , will
now replaced by the following inductive definition of an unsliced set W(A): W(A)
is the least set Y s.t., if α ∈ Cα(A) and Cα(A) ∩ α ⊆ Y , then α ∈ Y . Our final
definition of distinquished is now as follows:
A is distinguished ⇔ A ⊑W(A)
Assuming that A ∩ Ωα ∼= W(A) ∩ Ωα (therefore A ∩ Ωα is distinguished) and
A ∩ Ωα+1 ∼= M(A) ∩ Ωα+1 (i.e. A ∩ Ωα+1 is sufficiently closed), it follows that
W(A) ∩ [Ωα,Ωα+1[ is the accessible part of the set [Ωα,Ωα+1[∩M(A), therefore the
new definition is essentially the same as the original definition of distinguished sets.
We will below show how to introduce W(A) and therefore as well the notion of “A
is distinguished” in ML1W.
Distinguished sets are well-ordered (since, if A is distinguished, α, β ∈ A, α < β,
then α ∈ Cβ(A) ∩ β). Now one can show using transfinite induction over distin-
guished sets that distinguished sets are essentially approximations of the same class:
If A, B are distinguished sets, α ∈ A and α ≤ B, then A ∩ (α + 1) ∼= B ∩ (α + 1).
In type theory, we take now P(N) := N → U as the notion of the powerset of N
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and form the union of all distinguished sets. This union will be a class W . W is a
distinguished class, i.e. if we define W for classes, we obtain W ⊑W(W).
If one forms by Meta-induction on n the classes W0 := (W ∩ I) ∪ {I}, Wn+1 :=
(W(Wn) ∩ ΩI+n+1) ∪ {ΩI+n+1}, one obtains as well distinguished classes. It can be
shown, using induction over distinguished sets, that distinguished sets and classes
A are closed under 0, I, +, the step to the next cardinal, the Veblen function,
the collapsing functions and λα.Ωα bounded by A, i.e. if the result of applying of
these operations is ≤ A, then it is in A. It follows that Ω1,ΩI+n ∈ Wn, therefore
ψΩ1(ΩI+n) ∈ Wn ∩ Ω1. Furthermore, Wn ∩ Ω1 is an initial segment of OT which is
well-ordered, and therefore we obtain transfinite induction up to ψΩ1(ΩI+n), provable
in ML1W.
Definition of W(A). First we define Ca(A) in type theory. We have that b ∈
Ca(A), if b ∈ A∩ a or b can be formed by one of the operations from other elements
of Ca(A), where the latter terms are smaller. When we unfold this, we get a finite
formula of the shape b ∈ Ca(A)⇔ b ∈ A∩a∨ ((c0 ∈ A∩a∨· · ·)∧ (c1 ∈ A∩a∨· · ·)).
This formula can be transformed into disjunctive normal form with atomic formulae
of the form c ∈ A ∩ a and therefore one can define for b ∈ OT a finite set Ka(b) of
finite sets of elements of OT s.t. b ∈ Ca(A) ⇔ ∃C ∈ Ka(b).C ⊆ A ∩ a. Ka(b) can
be introduced in type theory directly by induction over OT. This way we obtain a
formalisation of Ca(A) in type theory.
W(A) itself can be defined using the W-type as follows: First a system of rules
for deriving statements of the form a ∈ W(A) for a : N can be given by having for
each a ∈ Ca(A) one rule
· · · a′ ∈W(A) · · · (a′ ∈ Ca(A) ∩ a)
a ∈W(A)
In type theory we can represent such derivations as elements of Wb : B.C(b), where
B := Σa : N.a ∈ Ca(A) and C(〈a, p〉) := Σa′ : N.a′ ∈ Ca(A) ∩ a. An element w :=
sup(〈a, p〉, q) derives a ∈ W(A) from subderivations q(c) (c : C(〈a, p〉)), provided
at each subtree of w (including w) the labels of the trees are respected: Define
label : (Wb : B.C(b)) → N, label(sup(〈a, p〉, q)) = a. Then the local correctness
needed at each subtree w′ is: If w′ = sup(〈a′, p′〉, q′), then the 〈a′′, q′′〉th subtree
of w′ has label a′′, i.e. label(q′(〈a′′, q′′〉)) =N a
′′. This local property for subtree
w′ will be called LocCor(w′). In order to define the notion of a subtree, we first
define the notion w ≺1Tree w
′, “w is an immediate subtree of w′” recursively as
w ≺1Tree sup(b, p) := ∃c : C(b).w =Wb:B.C(b) p(c). Here a =D b denotes the intensional
equality type for a, b : D. Now we define w Tree w
′, “w is a subtree of w′ or equal
to w′”, as “there exists a sequence of trees (w0, . . . , wn) s.t. n ≥ 0, w0 =Wb:B.C(b) w
′,
wn =Wb:B.C(b) w and for k = 0, . . . , n− 1 wk+1 ≺
1
Tree wk. We define Cor(w) := ∀w
′ :
(Wb : B.C(b)).w′ Tree w → LocCor(w
′) and
a ∈W(A) :⇔ ∃w : (Wb : B.C(b)).Cor(w) ∧ label(w) =A a .
It is an easy exercise to verify that a ∈ Ca(A) → (∀a′ ∈ Ca(A) ∩ a.a′ ∈ W(A)) →
a ∈W(A) holds and that we obtain the least such set. The latter can be expressed
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by the following induction principle (assuming a : N⇒ D(a) : Type):
(∀a ∈W(A).(∀a′ ∈ Ca(A) ∩ a.D(a′))→ D(a))→ ∀a ∈W(A).D(a). This completes
the well-ordering proof.
APPENDIX C: A MODEL FOR TYPE THEORY WITH W-TYPE AND ONE
MAHLO UNIVERSE
We will in the following give the details of the model of MLM in KPM+. The main
construction is as for KPI+, the only difference is of course how to interpret the
Mahlo universe itself. This is done as follows:
Similarly as when interpreting the universe of ML1W, one defines simultaneously
sets of pairs of terms Vα together with a set of pairs of terms Tα(r) for r s.t.
〈r, r〉 ∈ Vα, with similar conditions as before. We identify in the following the
names of the constructors for sets in V and in U~f , i.e. we identify N˜ with N̂, Σ˜ with
Σ̂ etc.
The inductive definition is for standard universe constructors as for an ordinary
universe. Assume now terms ~f , ~g, and an α is s.t. Vα is closed under the standard
universe constructions, and s.t. if a ∈ Vα, b ∈ Tα(a)→ Vα, then 〈f0(a, b), g0(a, b)〉 ∈
Vα and for c : Tα(f0(a, b)), 〈f1(a, b, c), g1(a, b, c)〉 ∈ V
α. Then 〈Û~f , Û~g〉 ∈ V
α+1 and
T(Û~f ) = V
β for the minimal β ≤ α, s.t. the above conditions hold with α replaced
by β.
Now let M :=
⋃
{α | α ∈ AdM} be the recursively Mahlo ordinal corresponding to
AdM and introduce a model with [[ V ]] := V
M. Since M is recursively inaccessible, it
follows as before that VM is closed under the usual universe constructions. We verify
now that VM is closed under the introduction rule for Û. For simplicity, we work as
if the interpretation of sets were a set of terms rather than a set of pairs of terms
considered to be equal, and we assume that we do not have any context. Assume
f0 ∈ [[ (a : V, b : T(a) → V) → V ]] and f1 ∈ [[ (a : V, b : T(a) → V,T(f
′
0(a, b))) →
V ]]f ′
0
7→f0
. This means that for a ∈ VM, b ∈ TM(a) → VM, f0(a, b) ∈ V
M and for
c ∈ TM(f0(a, b)), f1(a, b, c) ∈ V
M. Assume now α < M. For every a ∈ Vα and
b ∈ Tα(a)→ Vα there exists a β < M s.t. f0(a, b) ∈ V
β. For every c ∈ Tβ(f0(a, b))
there exists a γ < M s.t. f1(a, b, c) ∈ V
γ. Using admissibility of M it follows that
there exists a β < M s.t. f0(a, b) ∈ V
β and for c ∈ Tβ(a, b), f1(a, b, c) ∈ V
β. Let
ϕ(α, β) := ∀a ∈ Vα.∀b ∈ Tα(a) → Vα.f0(a, b) ∈ V
β ∧ ∀c ∈ Tα(f0(a, b)).f1(a, b, c) ∈
Vβ. Then ∀α < M.∃β < M.ϕ(α, β), where ϕ(α, β) is ∆0. Furthermore, we have
∀α < M.∃β < M.β = ℵrecα which is as well a ∆0-formula. By the Mahlo axiom
there exists a κ < M, which is admissible, s.t. ∀α < κ.∃β < κ.β = ℵrecα , i.e.
s.t. κ is recursively inaccessible, and s.t. ∀α < κ.∃β < κ.ϕ(α, β). Since we have
demanded Tα(a) ∈ Lℵrecα it follows T
κ(a) ∈ Lκ for a ∈ V
κ. Using admissibility of κ
it follows from the above that if a ∈ Vκ, b ∈ Tκ(a)→ Vκ then f0(a, b) ∈ V
κ and for
c ∈ Tκ(f0(a, b)), f1(a, b, c) ∈ V
κ, and therefore Û~f ∈ V
κ+1 ⊆ VM.
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APPENDIX D: PROOF THAT INDUCTIVE-RECURSIVE DEFINITIONS
REACH THE STRENGTH OF KPM
We show here how to adapt the well-ordering proof for the Mahlo universe in order
to show that the theory of inductive-recursive definitions reaches the strength of
KPM, Kripke-Platek set theory plus recursive Mahloness of the set-theoretic uni-
verse. We make use of the fact that Set is a weak variant of the Mahlo universe, as
described in Section 7. In the well-ordering proof for type theory with one Mahlo
universe, similarly as in that for ML1W, one introduces the union of distinguished
sets W , where sets were elements of N → V and V is the Mahlo universe. Then
one introduces finitely many distinguished classes on top of W , which corresponds
to the step to finitely many admissibles above the recursively Mahlo ordinal. The
formation of those sets makes use of the W-type, formed using sets depending on
V. In the theory of inductive-recursive definitions, we can from W as union of all
distinguished sets as elements of N → Set, but we cannot form the nth admissible
set above W . We cannot express that W is distinguished, however W will inherit
the closure properties of distinguished sets. One can show transfinite induction over
W ′ := (W ∩ M) ∪ {M}. Using induction into types one can then show transfi-
nite induction up to the ntimes nested Cantor Normal Form over elements in W ′,
which is essentially transfinite induction up to ω·
·
·
ωM+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
This allows then show that
αn := ψΩ1(ω
··
·
ωM+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
) is in W , and, since W ∩ (αn+1) is a segment of OT, transfinite
induction up to αn. Since ψΩ1(ǫM+1) = supn∈ω αn, it follows that the strength of
the type theory of inductive-recursive definitions is at least ψΩ1(ǫM+1), which is the
proof theoretic ordinal of KPM. The strength of KPM is only slightly below that
of KPM+, the strength of type theory with one Mahlo universe.
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